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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Stolyarov on Development of Personnel Work Committee

93UM0068A Moscow VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian No 9, 92 (signed to press 29 Jul 92)
pp 8-12

[Interview with Major General of Aviation Nikolay Sergeyevich Stolyarov, assistant CinC CIS Joint Armed Forces for personnel work, chairman of Personnel Work Committee, candidate of sciences, docent, occasion, date and place not specified, by chief editor of VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY, under rubric "A Frank Conversation": "Let Borders Unite Us"]

[Text] Nikolay Sergeyevich Stolyarov was born 3 January 1947 in the village of Aleksandrovka, Gomel Oblast, to a worker's family. He began labor activity at age 16. He completed the Yeysk Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, served in various command and staff positions in Air Force units, and after completing the Air Academy worked as an instructor for ten years. He became a candidate of sciences and docent.

At the end of the 1980's he took up sociopolitical activity and here quickly advanced. He was elected to leadership entities of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee and was appointed deputy chairman of the USSR KGB. At the end of last year he was appointed assistant CinC CIS Joint Armed Forces for personnel work and chairman of the Personnel Work Committee. He is married and has a son who is a cadet and a daughter who is a student at Moscow State University.

[Chief Editor] Nikolay Sergeyevich, after such a brief reminder to journal readers about the interviewee's biographical data, which is traditional for our rubric, I will permit myself to ask you, well, let's say a somewhat scandalous question. Well then, you quite recently headed up the Personnel Work Committee. Speaking at the everyday level, many duties of the once powerful chief of the Main Political Directorate were placed on you. Committee structures are in the making and they are functioning under provisional legal acts. It follows that you have no end of work here, as they say. But instead of taking it up, you took on that peacemaking mission to settle conflicts in hot spots, liberate hostages and so on. There is no question this is very important, but does it not seem to you that by engaging specifically in that activity you are working more for personal authority and personal popularity than in support of the job assigned you?

[Stolyarov] It does not. Even if I did nothing else in my post except gain the release of hostages, my brothers in arms in Armenia and Moldova, then even in this case I would not consider that I was "sitting" here for nothing. And I am not about to enlarge on this further. That is first. Secondly, you flatter yourself somewhat if you assume that you stunned me so with the question. During the All-Services Conference of Officer Meeting Representatives I was openly called a general dying to become a dictator and frightening presidents and the public with a military coup. Of course! For Stolyarov comes from communist functionaries and worked in the KGB. Generally he is an ardent albeit secret enemy of democracy.

Here my zealous accusers at the same time somehow forgot everything, that in the past almost all of them faithfully served totalitarianism, that it was their sometimes ecstatically democratic passions that I had to defend for almost a year in the position of chairman of the Central Control Commission, that together we "defended the White House during the August putsch," and that I received the appointment of deputy chairman of the KGB from the hands of the main characters of democratic authority.

It would appear that if so-called "leftists" rather unequivocally "branded" me, then according to the logic of things the "rightists" should have welcomed me. That was not the case. They made the accusation against me that Stolyarov allegedly did everything at the meeting so as not to allow the officers to give the Presidents an ultimatum on restoration of the USSR and to adopt a stern resolution.

And you say a "somewhat scandalous question." Without fearing to be falsely understood by the readers, I will note that I have more than enough warriorlike qualities. This is why I am not concerned with personal popularity and I do not hide my negative attitude toward those people who, on encountering today's reality, constantly whimper about how bad everything is around them, there are no conditions for work, and those around them do not understand them and are not following them into a bright future. And they say the ones guilty of this are the reviving patriotic movements, sinister representatives of the military-industrial complex, hard-headed generals, bureaucratic trade unions, indifferent youth and so on and so forth.

All this is "democratic sobbing" to me. It was long before the so-called perestroika that I firmly understood for myself that life is a harsh if not cruel thing, and the worst things in it are sorrowful lamentations. And I also firmly know that incompetents are incompetents in all times; it is not important what party they end up in: communist, socialist, "Democratic Russia" or Travkin's very reasonable party.

We all have to work; not moan, not whine, and not complain of abominable conditions. There is not nor can there be an alternative to this aim at creative, constructive work. And I will express one more view in passing.

The times now are such that everyone invested with authority has to understand that we must work not in an artificially modeled social environment where everything is assigned to its place but, figuratively speaking, in a gigantic boiling pot where a very complex broth of human passions, aspirations and interests which at times are mutually exclusive is bubbling. And then it is true, for example: What are we to do with conservatives who are stubborn in their striving to preserve previous reality? And is it worthwhile for us to declare all, absolutely all, reality unwise?

In continuing to respond, I must say with all responsibility that constant, purposeful and very specific work is being done with personnel even though the acts under which the Committee is functioning are provisional. In other words, personnel work entities are effectively ensuring implementation of combat and mobilization readiness and troop training measures, taking part in their inspections, giving methods assistance in questions of social-legal protection and cultural support of personnel, and representing the interests of servicemen and their families with state authorities and in military command and control entities.

So if someone believes out of ignorance or misunderstanding that our institution of assistant commanders for personnel work allegedly consists of those same political officers from whom the "punitive club" was taken, this is a very deep delusion. The new entities will work in a new way, with consideration of those irreversible changes which have occurred in the Army.

First Digression

So many drastic and radical political shocks have come down on us in the last few years, dear readers, that honestly speaking, we simply have lost our wits because of them. But the historic significance of such events is by no means diminished because of this fact. As a matter of fact, can one really consider, for example, the abolition of political entities in the Army and Navy to be a rank-and-file historical episode? No, of course not. Having been deprived of political entities, our Armed Forces acquired a new quality and were changed radically and irreversibly. Such revolutionary transformations in a basic state institution summoned completely new people into the arena of military-political life. Nikolay Sergeyevich Stolyarov belongs to them without any doubt. This is a fundamental point, and I am developing it consciously despite the fact that in this specific case I risk being taken as excessively servile.

The fact is that such a swift ascent to the real pinnacles of power by people with such biographies as Stolyarov's was in principle impossible just 5-7 years ago. The system rejected them with Procrustean severity and fanaticism and thereby insured itself that against a background of gray personalities the very same gray (but adroit and clever) personalities always received the odds and advanced.

[Chief Editor] It probably makes sense to describe in more detail the set of missions assigned to personnel work entities.

[Stolyarov] We engage most seriously in developing and implementing measures for preventing law infractions among personnel, for maintaining firm discipline and law and order among the troops, and for making military collectives cohesive. We conduct educational work to form citizen-patriot qualities in servicemen and allegiance to military duty and the military oath. There is really no end of work here. Several years of nihilistic propaganda that frankly speaking was far from constructive did our Armed Forces enormous damage. By the way, the same processes were taking place in the Army as in society. Because of them, today we literally have a wave of dissatisfaction that the Motherland has been lost, that there is no longer a great power in which almost all of us took pride in belonging to, that crime has "stopped up" almost all pores of the social organism, and that those authorized to fight it also have been scattered and thrown about seemingly especially and with malicious intent and themselves unmercifully beaten and tortured by cruel treatment.

Information support of military command and control entities, organization of objective, prompt information for personnel without ideological blinders and hidden agenda, and their social-humanitarian training are among our primary missions. We engage in a thorough study and analysis of social processes in military collectives and of the public opinion and sentiments of servicemen and their families and on this basis develop recommendations needed by military command and control entities. These are very

complex, multiprofile tasks, but they are being accomplished, and rather successfully, largely because qualified cadres managed to be preserved with the elimination of political entities in the Army and Navy.

Personnel work entities have been given the duty of organizing social-legal support of troop activity, promptly settling complaints and claims, studying the needs and wants of servicemen and their families and of Russian Army workers and employees, and developing and implementing measures for complying with principles of social justice.

One of the Committee's most important tasks at the present stage of social development is to maintain the closest informal ties with all kinds of public associations of citizens, creative unions, and philanthropic and religious organizations on all questions of social-legal protection and spiritual development of society.

I could continue enumerating those duties placed on the institution of assistants as a whole and on the officials working in it, but in my opinion it is important to emphasize something else here. In principle, the assistant commander for personnel work is not a controller or inspector. In my view, he is a natural connecting link between the military supervisor and his subordinates. It seems that the position's very name contains deep meaning: assistant, i.e., a person whose primary task is to assist his commander in every way, look into a problem professionally and knowledgeably, and solve it as effectively as possible.

What has been said does not at all mean that assistants are doomed to be eternally in secondary roles and in the shadow. If our most important goal is to create a healthy moral atmosphere in Army collectives, then the question arises: How is it possible to achieve that goal without self-starting, aggressive work that is altogether devoid of stereotypes and bureaucratism, especially now, when there is such destruction going on everywhere in the economy, politics and the cultural life of society? It was in the time of stagnation that measures served only for a check mark, for the higher-ups. Now we have quite different times.

Second Digression

No matter what my companion said, at the level of ordinary awareness among servicemen of all categories and ranks, the institution of assistants he heads is considered a direct successor to the former Main Political Directorate. I had rather frequent occasion in the past to encounter this structure that was unique in its way. Well, there is no denying that as a representative of the military press I myself was a minute part of the great Main Political Directorate Moloch, and for that very reason I can assert that today's Committee differs just as much from the former Main Political Directorate as General Stolyarov differs from all those who headed the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy in the past.

I am aware how risky and uncustomary the attempt to personify my reasoning on this problem appears, but still, remember how ordinary and at times also frankly short-witted the heads of the Main Political Directorate were. Those such as D. Volkogonov were the exception which only confirmed the rule: not intellect, not organizing abilities, but quite different qualities were required to clamber to the peak of the military-political pyramid.

Remember that in all times our political chiefs appeared so terribly much in all the mass media. A most enormous propaganda flow poured onto the heads of servicemen, but achieved directly opposite goals: it did not mobilize the people, but plunged them into a state of apathy. The most complete profanation of educational work occurred also largely because it was conducted, to say the least, formally—mockingly, tritely, and in a devil-may-care way. Not one political chief ever expressed his thoughts and his position orally or in writing. He spoke only with the loud megaphone of the ruling ideology. Only ringing but dead words always came from such megaphones. They never were able to stir up people for live work.

...Recently I was reading an article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences N. Stolyarov, "Is Everything That Is Real Unreasonable?" It makes no sense to retell it; whoever takes an interest will not regret it. I will speak of something else. Although he is of a high rank, the article does not contain thoughts of a functionary. There is a pain of the heart which is impossible not to share if you wish the homeland well. And so you have the entire difference between past and present propaganda, structures and personalities...

[Chief Editor] You understand full well, Nikolay Sergeyevich, that the technology of putting out a journal knowingly places us in a difficult spot. We speak in the most general terms about missions of the Committee which you head. Meanwhile, when the journal arrives for subscribers, the Personnel Work Committee will exist for exactly a half-year. It will be high time, as they say, to sum up certain results. I say this so that you too must tell the readers not only about the possible and presumed, but also about the quite specific work already being done by Committee entities.

[Stolyarov] If one were to answer this question in the most general terms, it will mean we are engaged in day-to-day and everyday work with a person who has become for us not in words, but in fact, the "measure of all things." Today this sphere remains the most complex and most acute in the Army and Navy. People in shoulderboards are in a greatly confused, uncertain and unsettled state. Unenviable as it is, their position is aggravated by the absence of effective, active social-legal protection. Therefore our Committee and all its entities from top to bottom are engaged above all in alleviating this stress and securing the rights of servicemen and their families locally as fully as possible. I fully admit that even by the time the journal is published this work still will not have gained sufficient completeness and effectiveness somewhere, but then it will already be necessary to look into each specific instance.

We took up propaganda of Russian Army traditions and study of its history very seriously. Strange as it may seem, the powerful ideological apparatus which existed in past years took up these questions quite sporadically, while entire systems and schools of upbringing on such traditions existed in pre-October Russia. Take for example RUSSKIY INVALID, ALEKSANDROVETS, VOYENNY ZHURNAL and other special publications, of which there were a great many. Well, it was possible to read excellent articles in them by officers and generals who posed problems and questions of permanent importance. In connection with this, I cannot help but recall lines from the article by Colonel of the General Staff Petr Izmeteyev: "Educating a soldier does not mean instilling in him external exemplary

aspects of military service. . . . Our task is to develop a soldier's sense of duty and love for the homeland, develop in him a deep concept of a sense of honor, develop in him self-respect and contempt for danger, and instill in him a conviction of the benefit of reasonable discipline, firm will, and a spirit of dedication and readiness to give his life for the Motherland..."

Just two or three years ago there could be no such problem in principle, but today we are forced to engage very seriously in strengthening ties with different religious confessions. A very enormous attraction to religion has been seen among servicemen. The principal reason is that ministers of religion remove pain from a person's soul not simply competently and skillfully, but also with love and compassion, and introduce calm and pacification to it. By the way, the science has not yet been mastered for many of us.

I am firmly convinced that if we succeed in realizing just part of what is planned, the Committee will work. Unquestionably, difficulties cannot be avoided, for in past years we educated each other so much and promised so many golden mountains to people that all faith has been lost. Difficulties of an organizational nature also are possible in the very process of our institution's functioning. Moreover, its organizational changes also are possible.¹ Life is life; it is difficult to anticipate everything it may place before us. But I will re-emphasize: a department is necessary which is objectively devoted to man and his anxieties, pains, hopes and cares. One should not exaggerate and frighten people with some kind of cataclysms, explosions and catastrophes. I believe people have enough wisdom and courage to stop at the edge of the precipice. And of course, no matter what kind of difficult situation occurs in society, in no instance should military force be used to resolve it. It is time to put an end once and for all to political manipulations with the Army.

Third Digression

I very much like the idea of one writer, who said approximately the following: how fine it is that people who have faces illuminated with thoughts now have come to leadership of the Armed Forces. This is really true, with rare exception which again only confirms the rule: energetic, progressive and, most important, wise commanders now are at the controls of our Army and Navy. In asserting this one does not even fear being incorrectly understood by someone, because that is how it is. It is another matter that these people came to power too late, when our glorious, our valorous Armed Forces have not simply reeled, but are falling apart.

I write these lines when Russia, taken to desperation, if it can be thus expressed, is forming its own Army and the duties of minister were assumed by President B. Yeltsin. A most wise, a most sage act! Otherwise so many candidates for minister already have appeared that a person is dumbfounded. One so wishes to exclaim: cross yourselves, people! Let well enough alone. We already have excellent leaders for the Russian Army that is being established. They proved by their actions their ability to sensibly and competently conduct military organizational development. Do not cast their experience overboard and do not force others to reinvent the wheel.

I fear that my voice is that of one crying in the wilderness. For this reason I do not impose these thoughts on my companion, and I even ask his pardon that such discourse appeared in the

context of our conversation. But if it already appeared, then what is the sense of keeping it to yourself?

[Chief Editor] Nikolay Sergeyevich, I recall your interview with a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent on the eve of the All-Service Conference of Officer Meeting Representatives. In predicting the further development of the sociopolitical situation, you outlined three versions. The last was the most gloomy. You said: "The CIS will fall apart, all forms of coordination and cooperation among independent sovereign states will be curtailed and national armed forces created on the basis of troops stationed on their territories." Strictly speaking, that is how it is today. It seems to me the process of disintegration is not dying down. Moreover, it has not yet reached the peak. Just what awaits us further?

[Stolyarov] The most thankless job is to make predictions in general, especially at such a troubled time... The following thought often attends me: I was born in Byelarus, studied in the Ukraine and now live in Russia. And there are not simply many such as I—practically the entire former Soviet Union consisted of us. We all are linked by more than a thousand years of history. All these are very serious points, and suddenly they seemingly are discarded in an offhand manner. All kinds of fences are piled up between people with a kind of folly and haste. It is even stranger and more incomprehensible in that the entire remaining civilized world is striving specifically for the reverse.

Meanwhile, extremely unattractive grimaces of the new ideology deprive us of any doubts concerning boundless sovietization or, to put it more simply, collapse. Is this really the truth which was necessary to reach through such long and terrible suffering? Well they removed, closed, destroyed, eliminated, and banned—but what is there in return? For the time being one sees an extremely insignificant (if not to say it more sharply) percentage of creative ferment in processes which are occurring, and it is difficult to build something without it. But times are changing and we are changing with them. By nature I am an incorrigible optimist and I believe in the best changes. And perhaps they already are not that far off, because people's stomachs are imperiously encroaching upon the arguments of minds. A metaphor, possibly, and not the most refined, but it means one thing: it is time for us to stop suffering from things that are not the wisest and begin joint economic work.

[Chief Editor] How can one not ask your opinion, Nikolay Sergeyevich, concerning our Air Defense Forces? What fate awaits them?

[Stolyarov] Fractionation of the Armed Forces is doing almost the most irreparable damage to what we customarily call a unified air space.

Meanwhile everything was not that simple even earlier, when the Union still existed, over the question of how many proprietors the sky has and how to safeguard it better and more effectively. Certain ones used the air space, others controlled traffic in it, and still others answered for the mistakes of all. Under the present superunstable conditions it has become immeasurably more difficult to regulate the activity of all interested persons in using air space. But here too I believe that sooner or later common sense will gain the upper hand over ambitions of the military and the politicians.

I know, for example, that the Air Defense Forces command element is seriously engaged in establishing a unified automated field on CIS territory. This is an excellent project. I would very much like to have the interests of all CIS members joined specifically around such initiatives in the future. So the Air Defense Forces still will function for a long time despite any changes, even the most radical ones, both in our society and in its Armed Forces.

And how can one know? Perhaps it is joint air defense that will unite us fastest of all.

Taking advantage of the occasion, I wish everyone well and good luck who serves in these necessary and wonderful troops.

[Chief Editor] Thank you for the interview.

Footnotes

1. Stolyarov was right. The Committee now has been renamed.

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CIS Veterans Affairs Committee Meets

93UM0104A Moscow PATRIOT in Russian No 43, Oct 92 (Signed to press 27 Oct 92) p 4

[Article by Nikolay Zhichkin: "They Did Not Hog the Covers..."]

[Text] A session of the Coordinating Council on Internationalist Servicemen Affairs has taken place. Taking part were: A.I. Zaykovskiy, adviser to the Working Group of the Council of CIS heads of government; from the Russian Federation—V.K. Ivanov, deputy chief of social programs administration of the Russian Federation State Labor Committee, plenipotentiary representative; from Ukraine—V.I. Ablazov, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian president's Committee for Afghanistan War Veterans and Participants in Local Wars in Other Foreign Countries, plenipotentiary representative; from Belarus—V.V. Drako, sector manager in the Directorate on Citizens' Rights, Public Safety, and Defense Matters of the Belarus Republic Government; Yu.A. Batyan, Council of Army Veterans chairman of the Belarus Republic; from Armenia—G.K. Yegapyan, first deputy minister of labor and social security of the Republic of Armenia, plenipotentiary representative; from Azerbaijan—F.Kh. Mamedov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Republic Council of Internationalist Servicemen; from Moldova—V.M. Lukantsov, press secretary of the Moldova Republic Embassy in Russia; from Kazakhstan—B.Ye. Khamzin, deputy chairman of the Council of Army Veterans of the Kazakhstan Republic; from Uzbekistan—M.S. Mukhamedova, first secretary of the permanent representation of the Uzbekistan Republic in Russia, plenipotentiary representative; from Kyrgyzstan—M.E. Esenomanov, first deputy minister of social security of the Kyrgyzstan Republic, V.V. Nezhenskiy, chairman of the republic Council of Army Veterans, I.V. Antsipirevich, chairman of the Rodina Association of Internationalist Servicemen; from Tajikistan—T.P. Shepelev, prominent specialist of the permanent representation of the Tajikistan Republic in Russia, plenipotentiary representative.

Members of the Committee on Internationalist Servicemen Affairs participated in the work of the Coordinating Council, as did the representatives of a number of ministries and departments, and workers in social organizations.

Four issues were put on the table for examination by the council: on practical measures for implementation of a comprehensive, interstate medical and social assistance program for internationalist servicemen; on a draft interstate agreement on social protection for war veterans; on working out joint measures on the part of state and social organizations of internationalist servicemen to resolve problems relating to prisoners of war (hostages); on the participation of organizations of war veterans in preparation for observance of the 50th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The first issue elicited a lively exchange of views (information on which was provided by Doctor of Medical Sciences G.Z. Demchenkova, head of the committee's Medical and Social Problems Department). All were in agreement that only joint efforts would yield success in managing the tremendous amount of work to be done. But insofar as the discussion entailed specific measures and how to support them financially and materially, attendees attempted to clarify—what would be set up, and where? To whom was money to be allocated? How much, and for what? Such questions cannot be considered secondary under today's conditions of general impoverishment. One point in the draft resolution, for example, states: "To establish in the states of the Commonwealth (Belarus, Tajikistan, the Russian Federation), jointly with foreign firms, prosthetics centers utilizing the newest foreign technologies." Immediately the question arises: "Why in these republics and not with us?"

To the honor of those assembled, it should be noted that the principle of "hog the covers" did not triumph. The council adopted the document with reasonable modifications.

Discussion of the document which the Committee on Internationalist Servicemen Affairs will present to the Council of Heads of Government of the CIS Countries was conducted with deep involvement—on providing internationalist servicemen a certain amount of guaranteed benefits regardless of the country of the Commonwealth in which they reside. Those who spoke on this topic noted that appropriate procedure in this matter is not being followed right now. In one location, presentation of identification as an internationalist serviceman gives one the right to benefits, while in another place one hears: "You go back...back to the place where they gave you this identification."

The document adopted provides special details on the rights of internationalist servicemen to work. This is very important under conditions of impending unemployment.

The Coordinating Council approved proposals to the draft agreement between member states of the Commonwealth on an interstate program of assistance to the population of regions which have suffered during the course of interethnic conflict. These proposals will also be presented to the Council of Heads of Government of the CIS States.

It is with great satisfaction that the council resolution "On the Development of Joint Measures by State and Social Organizations of Internationalist Servicemen in Resolving

the Problems of Prisoners of War (Hostages)" will be received by society, the parents of servicemen, and by servicemen themselves of all the CIS states. The fact that hundreds of former USSR citizens, now citizens of independent states, are prisoners in Afghanistan is well known. The committee is in close contact with other departments and is doing everything it can to obtain their release. True, success is not being seen presently in every area. This is an extremely complex issue—especially now, when Russia and other Commonwealth states are not powerful.

But indeed, who really knows how many prisoners of war (hostages) there are at present among warring sides at "hot spots" in the former USSR? How are they being treated? Are the norms of international law being observed? There are no clear answers to these questions. More often than not, one side accuses another of having committed deadly sins, and vice versa.

The Coordinating Council considered it necessary to present the following proposal to the heads of state and government of the Commonwealth: to acknowledge at the state level the fact of the existence of prisoners of war in countries where military conflicts took place; to examine practical measures for resolving this issue on the basis of international law at a session of the Council of Chiefs of State. Among such practical measures, it is proposed to establish a working group under the Main Command of the CIS Combined Armed Forces, jointly with the Committee on Internationalist Servicemen Affairs and other involved departments, for drawing up resolutions on these problems.

As I listened to the discussion of this issue and conversed with council members during session breaks, I became convinced that if this heavy burden is not lifted from us, it will in no way be the fault of the committee. It will then be necessary to seek the guilty party in a number of state structures of the CIS countries.

Last discussed, but not of least importance, were measures in preparation for the 50th Anniversary of Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War. Information on this subject was provided by V.G. Mikhaylov, chairman of the board of the movement "War Veterans for Peace." The Coordinating Council resolved to support the proposals on preparation for this anniversary which were recommended by the Committee on Internationalist Servicemen Affairs and other veterans' and social organizations. It was decided to send letters on behalf of the council to the Commonwealth heads of state proposing that joint events be planned and conducted in connection with the coming anniversary.

And so, all the issues which were discussed by the Coordinating Council on Internationalist Servicemen Affairs were reflected in official documents. Their implementation will assist in satisfying the many needs of our soldiers of yesterday, sent by the Motherland to fight beyond the borders of their country.

Publication of New Combined Arms Regulation

93UM0051B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Oct 92 p 3

[Telephone query by Captain S. Starkov and unattributed response, under the rubric: "Briefing for Readers": "New Regulations—in the Troops"]

[Text] As we all know, interim combined arms regulations were recently approved by a Russian Federation Presidential edict. When will they be published and disseminated in the troops?

Captain S. Starkov

Russian Minister of Defense Order No 160 "On Interim Russian Federation Armed Forces Combined Arms Regulations" was published on 25 September 1992. In accordance with that document, Voenizdat [Military Publishing House] will publish interim internal service, disciplinary, garrison, guard service, and drill regulations in a limited circulation of 280,000 copies each by 1 December 1992. They will be distributed to military administrative organs and to the troops by 25 December 1992.

We also report: Work is being organized to gather and analyze the proposals of servicemen, Armed Forces veterans, and other citizens to prepare permanent regulations.

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Mikhaylov Comments On Nuclear Weapons Museum

934P0015A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Gubarev: "Nuclear Weapons Museum"]

[Text] Russian Minister of Atomic Power Viktor Mikhaylov once said:

"Our people shouldn't fear nuclear weapons, but be proud of them, since they have helped preserve peace on the planet and ensured the motherland's security."

"But most of us have not only not seen nuclear warheads firsthand, we haven't even seen pictures of them, since these things are considered very secret," I objected. "And people are always afraid of things they have never seen. Incidentally, in my opinion, there is nothing secret about the 'wares' that were produced in the beginning of the atomic age. But modern weapons are another thing."

"You know," the minister said smiling, "even most of the residents of such cities as Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, where the terrifying weapons are produced, have never seen them. For many years, they didn't even know what exactly they were working on."

Mikhaylov's statement was no exaggeration. On a visit to Arzamas-16, as I examined the various machinery and work areas, I often asked the people I spoke with: "Did you really know exactly where you were working and on what?" And I most often heard a negative answer. The secrecy was extremely strict. Academician Trutnev, one of the thermonuclear weapon's developers, related an almost anecdotal incident. A proving ground was visited by a group of specialists, among them an employee of Arzamas-16. It seems he was a test specialist. Tests on the hydrogen bomb were to be conducted the next day, and they were standing around and talking right next to it (the "product" had not yet been uncovered). The test specialist happened to lean over the bomb, resting his elbows on it.

"They just broadcast a speech by the chairman of the council of ministers," the specialist said. "We have developed a hydrogen weapon. Can you imagine, this means that somewhere in this country we have a center that is working on such an enormously powerful weapon! I'd sure like to go there and see the place!"

Everyone burst out laughing in unison. Only then did the test specialist find out what he was resting his elbows on.

It was after that test that negotiations on banning atmospheric, surface, and underwater testing—negotiations on which the physicists at Arzamas-16, under the direction of Academician Sakharov, had insisted on—began to make more progress, and soon the tests were banned altogether.

Every exhibit at the museum represents a page of history. They can be viewed and interpreted in different ways. People can take delight in them or denigrate them, be proud or condemn them—it all depends on an opponent's viewpoint. But that history has already occurred, it exists, and we are obliged to know it and to communicate the truth of those times to not only our contemporaries, but also our children and grandchildren. In my opinion, this cause is served by the exhibits at the Nuclear Weapons Museum.

The opening of a museum of this type is undoubtedly an unusual event. Not just the city's residents but also visitors will be able to learn about its "main output." And a lot of guests are visiting Arzamas-16—not just journalists, but also scientists and specialists from various countries of the world. Their interest in this major Russian research center can be readily explained and understood; for a broad process of disarmament—in particular nuclear disarmament—is getting under way, and once again, Arzamas-16 is playing a major role in it. I think that everyone will understand that only an insignificant portion of all nuclear weapons types are represented here—for our country is scrupulously complying with the principles of nuclear arms nonproliferation, and they were meticulously observed in setting up the exhibits. We cannot allow a situation in which some dictatorial regime could take advantage of our experience.

What exactly can be seen at the museum?

I meticulously copied down all the information on the signs that are mounted beside the exhibits:

"THE USSR'S FIRST ATOMIC BOMB. Produced in 1951. Yield: 20 kilotonnes of TNT. Bomb was flight tested. Weapon was never placed in service."

"USSR'S FIRST SERIES-PRODUCED ATOMIC BOMB. Placed in service in 1953. Yield: 30 kilotonnes of TNT."

"WORLD'S FIRST HYDROGEN BOMB. Yield: 400 kilotonnes of TNT. Weapon tested on August 12, 1953, at the Semipalatinsk proving ground."

"FIRST NUCLEAR WARHEAD FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE. Placed in service in 1956. Range: up to 1,200 kilometers. Yield: 40 kilotonnes of TNT."

"THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD FOR STRATEGIC MISSILE MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE."

"FIRST SERIES-PRODUCED NUCLEAR WARHEAD FOR TACTICAL MISSILE."

"FIRST THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD FOR INTER-CONTINENTAL STRATEGIC MISSILE. Placed in service in 1958. Flight range: 8,500 kilometers. Yield: three megatonnes of TNT."

"WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL EXPERIMENTAL THERMONUCLEAR AERIAL BOMB. Tested in 1962 at Novaya Zemlya proving ground. Altitude: 4,500 meters. Rated power: 100 megatonnes of TNT. Tested at half-yield."

In a corner of the hall is a control panel. At first glance, it is not a very sophisticated device. There are several switches that activate various systems. At the center of the control panel is the main switch. It is enclosed in a high-strength transparent glass case. Just to the side is a special lock, intended to prevent any unauthorized person from opening the case and throwing the switch. These days, the unsophisticated device (the lock looks like one that might be found on a barn door) might draw smiles—how primitive the technology was in those days! In my opinion, this exhibit in particular graphically demonstrates how far technology has progressed over the past 50 years. And it reminds us once more: If we neglect the development of science today, we could return to the past from which, thanks to the talent and labors of several generations, we have advanced so far.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Aerospace Defense of the State: Fundamentals of Its Organization Under New Military-Political Conditions

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PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian
No 9, 92 (signed to press 29 Jul 92) pp 3-7

[Article by Colonel General V. Miruk, candidate of military sciences, and Colonel A. Yuryev, candidate of military sciences, docent, under rubric "If Threat Becomes Reality"]

[Text] A number of fundamental changes occurred in political, economic and social conditions of the majority of states of the world community. The most radical changes were those of our neighbors in states that are former members of the Warsaw Pact. Like processes occurring in sovereign states of the former USSR, these changes also were reflected directly in many aspects of the military-political situation. Although the process has not yet concluded, certain trends have shown up which demand new approaches in resolving complex problems of our state's security.

The existing approaches were clearly oriented toward determining the probable enemy. After results were received as to which states or coalitions were the probable enemies, the entire system of strategic, operational and tactical measures was determined for advance and immediate preparation of military operations. The level of practical implementation of these measures was made dependent on the degree of existing military danger.

Results of the changed military-political situation led to the impossibility of applying known methodological approaches for estimating the existing and predicted degree of military danger and subsequently determining the enemy for whose repulse, strictly speaking, the entire system of state defense is built.

It should be noted that without identifying potential, probable and opposing enemies and determining the degree of military danger, results of an analysis of the military-political situation are devoid of meaning from a military standpoint. The identification of enemies must become not a politicized suspicion of the military, but the results of a detailed, comprehensive, scientific forecast for substantiating the military-technical part of doctrine and determining forms and methods of attaining state security.

In our view, under these new conditions it is necessary to proceed from the fact that relations among states or coalitions can be characterized from a military standpoint by one of four conditions: absence of military danger, [presence of military danger], military threat, or war. A potential, probable or opposing enemy respectively appears for the state in the last three conditions.

Military danger for the state or coalition is understood to mean that condition of relations among states characterized by the presence of historical contradictions or by the appearance of new ones containing the abstract possibility of initiation of war.

Military threat is understood to mean an aggravated condition of interstate relations characterized by a high likelihood of the initiation of war on the part of a specific state or coalition—the probable enemy.

Just what general conclusions can be drawn as a result of an analysis of the modern military-political situation and forecast of its development?

First of all, there has been a change in disposition of political forces in the world, which has turned from bipolar to multipolar. A new disposition of forces with centers in Europe, the Asiatic-Pacific region, and South Asia is forming in place of global opposition between the USSR and United States. As a result the strain on relations between states which were considered probable enemies after World War II has diminished and the level of military confrontation has been lowered, but there are no guarantees of the irreversibility of such changes. And although the external military threat presently has been removed for many states (there are no probable enemies), there remain sources of military danger and with them also potential enemies.

Although it has diminished, the probability of initiation of a world war has been preserved and there has even been an increased possibility of conflicts appearing in individual regions, including at the borders of Russia and other Commonwealth states, with a subsequent escalation of military operations.

Secondly, there has been a substantial change in views of the military-political leadership of a number of developed states on the goals and possible character of military operations. The development of military strategy and armed forces of the United States and other NATO countries presently is oriented toward swift, effective employment of military force in regional conflicts that arise suddenly. In this connection the process of a reduction in numerical strength of their armed forces is beginning. But all nuclear countries deem it necessary to retain not only sufficiently powerful groupings of nuclear forces, but also their ability to reconstitute the combat might necessary for conducting a conventional war on a global scale.

Thirdly, the beginning and conduct of military operations in a new form, the air campaign, is becoming most likely in view of the absence of direct contact of large strategic ground force groupings in peacetime, the rather large outlays of time, personnel and equipment for their deployment, and also the political leadership's desire to avoid high personnel losses and the presence of mobile, powerful offensive air groupings. The goal of the air campaign can coincide with the ultimate goal of the war.

An air campaign is understood to mean the aggregate of offensive air operations and systematic combat operations by aerospace attack forces as well as operations by raiding and reconnaissance forces coordinated by goals, missions, objectives, place and time, conducted under a unified concept and aimed at achieving intermediate or ultimate military-political goals of war. The duration is from several weeks to several months and sometimes even more. That form of military operations can be used above all where there is no direct contact of ground force groupings.

This was clearly demonstrated in the Persian Gulf in 1991. War goals were achieved basically by employing arms and military equipment of a high technological level and by a new form of military operations, the air campaign.

The Persian Gulf war once again demonstrated the growing role of the factor of surprise, attainment of which both on an operational as well as tactical scale is ensured basically by operations of aerospace attack forces from the makeup of a powerful multinational grouping created in a relatively short time in a region of the world remote from principal TVD's [theaters of military operations]. Considering the ever growing effectiveness of aerospace attack weapons and the ever greater significance of their first strikes, preemption in operations can ensure not only seizure of the operational and strategic initiative, but also can decide the outcome of the war.

Under these conditions, covering the state against strikes from air and space is a very important strategic mission and aerospace defense assumes new importance. Assessments show that destruction of up to 50 percent of economic potential, above all power engineering, places any developed country on the brink of catastrophe. Today the strike potential of aerospace attack forces permits accomplishing these missions both in nuclear as well as conventional war, especially with respect to an individual state. Therefore along with retaliatory strike forces, aerospace defense becomes a deciding factor for deterring aggression. Weakness of aerospace defense can provoke an aggressor to deliver surprise strikes even against strategic nuclear forces.

The conclusion that the aerospace phase of war is highly likely to be the basic content of its initial period poses the problem for military science of organizing aerospace defense under these new conditions.

Aerospace defense forces must be in constant readiness for effective performance of missions of covering the strategic deployment of forces, winning superiority in air and space, preserving necessary potential of retaliatory strike forces, and covering command and control facilities of the highest echelons, key installations of the economy, and the population against strikes from air and space. The regional aerospace defense grouping must be created by concentrating efforts of aerospace defense forces on main axes of enemy

operations back before the initiation of military operations, in a condition of military threat. This is possible only within the scope of a unified aerospace defense system of Commonwealth states, with preparation of operations of all aerospace defense forces on the basis of unified command and control.

Another necessary condition for this is the presence of a strategic and operational mobile reserve of aerospace defense forces enabling swift reaction to the probable enemy's establishment (buildup) of groupings of aerospace attack forces as well as necessary supplies both through their maneuver as well as dual basing.

It is not just a sufficient quantity of quality arms and timely deployment and concentration of forces that makes successful repulse of aggression possible. Operations coordinated at the strategic and operational levels are required for engaging groupings of aerospace attack forces at basing locations and destroying production capacities for their production and repair as well as destroying reserves.

In their makeup, organizational structure and weapon capabilities, aerospace defense forces must conform to the level of development and scale of missions of aerospace attack forces of the leading world countries in order to be capable not only of repelling the first and most powerful strikes, but also inflicting telling losses on the aerospace enemy and disrupting his offensive airborne operation.

In this connection the immediate goal of developing an aerospace defense consists of deterring a potential enemy from aerospace attack and of repelling aggression in case it is carried out.

Any goal of force operations is determined by the decision of corresponding one-man commanders, otherwise command and control is lost. A decision is made on the command and control mission or on a totality of missions. The command and control mission is understood to mean the desired result of an action by forces requiring a command and control decision of the one-man commander—the commanding general or commander.

Experience shows that the essence of command and control of aerospace defense forces consists of coordinating decisions of one-man commanders and collective command and control entities of various institutions of the state (coalition of states) and armed forces units for determining aerospace defense goals and forming and supporting conditions under which people belonging to various organizations of a state or coalition of states and armed forces are prompted to act productively and effectively in the direction of achieving aerospace defense goals with minimum outlays of time, equipment and forces.

Thus goals, missions, and forms and methods of operations are the basis of starting premises for organizing aerospace defense.

Goals and missions of primary and supporting operations of forces in aerospace defense; the makeup of forces used for operations in aerospace defense missions; the kinds, forms and methods of these operations; international and departmental legislative and standard acts; restrictions imposed by political, economic and social capacities and goals of the state and by the goals and missions of its armed forces; local conditions of the developing situation; and also the limiting

actions for achieving the main goals and missions of aerospace defense, and the organizational structure of forces employed have a determining influence on missions of command and control of forces.

Depending on the goals, missions and scale of desired results of operations, command and control missions can be divided into strategic, operational and tactical. The process of delegating authority for their accomplishment as a rule ends with legislative and standard acts of state authorities and international acts for joint and coalition groupings of armed forces and so is an inalienable part of organizing state aerospace defense.

In this connection the goals and missions of aerospace defense operations as well as missions of command and control of aerospace defense forces presently are of the greatest interest for organizing aerospace defense.

The complexity and high cost of aerospace defense goals and missions, measured by victory or defeat in war, the global nature of opposition in aerospace, the need for a rapid transfer of efforts to main axes for creating a favorable force ratio, and the impossibility of successfully performing missions of repelling an aerospace attack with limited forces also require unity of operations of all aerospace defense forces. This is ensured to the greatest extent with their centralized command and control. The majority of developed world countries are following that path. The United States created a coalition command together with Canada for defense of the North American continent. Developing and building a new system for air defense of the Western European continent can become a very major NATO program.

Massive employment of aerospace attack forces must be opposed by operations of aerospace defense forces on a corresponding scale. Therefore in determining the makeup of aerospace defense force groupings, it is necessary to consider both the deployed grouping of aerospace attack forces as well as their possible reinforcement. Combat capabilities of aerospace defense groupings for the necessary force ratio can be provided through a strategic and operational maneuver.

A special approach to organizing air defense in the border zone is required in anticipation of the possible beginning of war from a situation of the absence of direct contact of ground force groupings. A unified grouping of air defense large strategic formations and formations, formations and units of air defense troops of military districts, and Navy and Air Force air defense forces can be created within established boundaries of responsibility with command and control from existing command posts of air defense corps and divisions and of SAM troops and air defense aviation formations and units, and the others can be used as alternates. This will permit elevating the stability of air defense with comprehensive employment of various forces and weapons and achieving maximum effectiveness of their employment by coordinated decisions of appropriate commanding generals and commanders.

The latest and prospective aerospace attack weapons operate in air and space by transferring from one sphere to the other. Mutually supplementing each other, aerospace defense weapons must cover the entire range of their employment altitudes, from low to space. This can be

provided with unified command and control of air defense and missile-space defense forces and weapons. In organizing command and control, efforts must be aimed at increasing the promptness of communicating information on weapon launches and operations of aerospace attack forces and issuing target designations to aerospace defense weapons. This mission can be accomplished not by separate employment of air defense and missile-space defense weapons, but by establishing a unified aerospace defense system.

A very important element of a unified aerospace defense system is a unified system for reconnaissance and warning of air, missile and space attack. This system must provide for timely detection, for tracking aerospace attack forces along their entire flight route, and for issuing information to command posts at various levels. It also must perform another important strategic mission—promptly warn states' supreme leadership about the beginning of attack from air or space for decisionmaking on retaliatory actions.

Decisions made to reduce the numerical strength of armed forces also demand that we take new approaches to organizing aerospace defense. Under existing conditions of a forced reduction of defense expenditures, one possible direction for ensuring a state's military security consists of actions to prevent regional conflicts. This also relates fully to aerospace defense.

Assessments show that a reduction in numerical strength of forces can be achieved only with a significant reduction in groupings of SAM troops, preserving them in defense only of the most important strategic installations, and reducing radar field parameters. In this connection the combat capabilities of groupings of Air Defense Forces on main aerospace axes are sharply decreased.

A regional balance of aerospace defense forces and aerospace attack forces on a particular axis or in a particular theater of military operations can be achieved by concentrating efforts of aerospace defense forces with the appearance of a military threat here. This is possible only within the framework of a unified aerospace defense system with unified planning of operations of all aerospace defense forces and on the basis of unified command and control. The command element of aerospace defense forces must have at its disposal a powerful mobile reserve of aerospace defense forces ensuring the possibility of strengthening axes and theaters commensurate with the enemy, and stockpiles being established here must support employment of this reserve.

The makeup of the reserve must include formations and units of fighter aviation and SAM troops outfitted with modern arms. At the same time, a system of reconnaissance and command and control of aerospace defense forces must be preserved and necessary conditions created for broad maneuver of aviation, movement and support of formations and units of SAM troops, training of cadres, and repair of arms and equipment to the extent permitting a buildup of the aerospace defense system in a period of threat. It is also important to have necessary mobilization resources, especially in the SAM troops. It is required to have training centers—bases for storage of arms and military equipment.

At the present time the previously established air defense system still is functioning within boundaries of sovereign states of the former Union, and at first glance there are no

problems in implementing the aforementioned directions of construction and development of the aerospace defense system. But a completely new situation has taken shape where sovereign states have formed in which different views have been defined on organizing their armed protection. Under these conditions, considering the economic slump in all states, it is very important to synchronize any step aimed at reorganizing the air defense system so as not to destroy that which has been created and is actually functioning. It is possible to ensure the sovereignty and inviolability of boundaries of each of the states at the present time only through joint efforts, making maximum use of the system of reconnaissance and command and control of aerospace defense forces adjusted over many years.

There must be a special approach to the missile-space defense system. Like the reconnaissance system, this system includes functionally related equipment stationed in space and on the territories of five independent states. This equipment can be used effectively only jointly in a unified system in support of all Commonwealth states.

The unity of air defense on a Commonwealth scale and the sovereignty of each independent state in air space is ensured to the greatest extent by aligning it on a territorial principle. The entire territory of Commonwealth states is divided into air defense zones and areas, boundaries of which correspond to boundaries of independent states and boundaries of responsibility of existing air defense large strategic formations and formations. In corps (division) air defense areas encompassing the territories of several independent states it is possible to establish brigade air defense areas which consolidate air defense formations and units deployed within the boundaries of an individual state. The functions of chiefs of air defense zones and areas must be performed by commanding generals of air defense large strategic formations (or air defense formation commanders).

Different variants are possible in mutual relations of chiefs of air defense zones and areas with other commanding generals and commanders. The basis of these mutual relations can be subordination of air defense zones and areas to one one-man commander, the aerospace defense commanding general. This is a necessary condition for preserving the unified air defense system and ensuring its functioning in support of all Commonwealth states. The following subordination options are the most likely: direct subordination, operational subordination in support of performance of peace and wartime missions, and operational subordination only for wartime. These options for each state must be indicated in the Statute on the Unified Aerospace Defense System of Commonwealth Member States, which must be worked out after heads of states or governments sign the Agreement defining general principles for creation and functioning of a unified aerospace defense system.

It will be necessary to determine the directions and procedure of cooperation in questions of aerospace defense with states which do not allow air defense large strategic formations and formations to be transferred to operational subordination of the aerospace defense commanding general in peacetime. Basic directions of cooperation can be as follows: coordinated use of all reconnaissance equipment in support of security of boundaries and of monitoring aerospace; giving assistance to crews performing flights in the border

zone and under *force majeure* circumstances; supporting coordinated joint operation of aerospace defense in repelling aggression, and others.

Command elements of these states' armed forces must participate fully in planning aerospace defense for the case of repelling aggression. Since the regional balance with aerospace attack forces under conditions of a reduction in numerical strength of forces is ensured only through strategic and operational maneuver, then it will be necessary to determine in advance the list of formations and units which will be used for reinforcing aerospace defense of each Commonwealth state and outline measures for comprehensive support of their operations on the territories of other states.

Questions determining directions of cooperation, the procedure of planning the employment of aerospace defense forces in repelling aggression, and others concerning peacetime activity of forces can be included in the Statute on the Unified Aerospace Defense System. Evidently the development of bilateral protocols on cooperation in questions of aerospace defense between individual states also is permissible.

The authority of the aerospace defense commanding general for directing forces in a unified aerospace defense system must be defined by legislative and standard acts of Commonwealth states and by orders and directives of the CinC Joint Armed Forces and commanding general of Strategic Forces. He must exercise command and control of aerospace defense forces and weapons from a central command post through commanding generals (commanders) of missile attack warning, space surveillance and ABM defense large strategic formations and through chiefs of air defense zones and separate areas. Command and control of all air defense forces deployed within boundaries of an air defense zone (area) is exercised by the chief of the air defense zone (area)/commanding general of the air defense large strategic formation (or air defense formation). Command and control can be exercised by the chief of fleet or front air defense in maritime and front air defense areas.

But the authority of the aerospace defense commanding general with respect to air defense large strategic formations and air defense formations from states' national armed forces transferred to his operational subordination can be limited to the need for coordinating their employment with the given state's military leadership. In peacetime it will be necessary to coordinate the procedure for employing alert forces in support of neighboring states. In planning aerospace defense of Commonwealth states for wartime, those forces which can be employed by the aerospace defense commanding general on his own decision for reinforcing axes at the border of adjacent states must be jointly determined, the procedure for establishing stockpiles for support of maneuver must be established, and standards must be determined as to the procedure for employing aerospace defense forces in support of another state with a change in the situation. They are what will be determining in decision-making for employing forces in the course of combat operations.

New conditions also are forming in organizing air defense in the air defense zone and area. With the formation of national armed forces a situation is possible where tactical

air defense formations and units of a particular state will be included in the makeup of this state's air defense system along with an air defense large strategic formation or air defense formation which is part of the Commonwealth Strategic Forces.

In a situation where the authority of the aerospace defense commanding general (and in a number of cases also of chiefs of air defense zones and areas) for employing operationally subordinate forces is limited, there is a sharp increase in the importance of joint operational and tactical training. Aerospace defense operations planned in detail for various conditions of the beginning of aggression and a constant rehearsal of methods of employing them in the course of operational and tactical training measures back in peacetime can decisively affect results of repelling first strikes of an aerospace enemy. For this the aerospace defense command element must plan and carry out operational and tactical training in coordination with ministers of defense of Commonwealth member states while striving for fullest use of combat capabilities of all aerospace defense forces regardless of their subordination and state affiliation.

The course and outcome of combat operations largely are determined by capabilities of arms and military equipment with which forces are outfitted. Aerospace defense arms must ensure effective combat against low-altitude cruise missiles, operational-tactical and tactical ballistic missiles, and targets manufactured with small-reflecting-surface technology.

Along with upgrading arms of SAM troops and fighter aviation, automated command and control systems, and air defense information assets, the problem of creating effective reconnaissance equipment which would ensure receipt of necessary data in a complicated electronic situation and also of creating new EW assets is advanced to the category of priority problems which must be solved. Considering limitations of defense appropriations in Commonwealth states in the next few years, it can be a question only of creating new models of arms and military equipment and conducting preparatory measures supporting a high degree of readiness to unfold their series production. Series production itself and deliveries to troops should begin with the appearance of a direct military threat.

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Will There Be Air Defense in the CIS?

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No 9, 92 (signed to press 29 Jul 92) pp 19-20

[Article by Major General of Aviation N. Kozlov, candidate of military sciences, and Colonel Yu. Levshov, candidate of military sciences, under rubric "View of a Problem"]

[Text] It is not simple to talk about the fate of the unified system of national air defense and armed forces today: there still is much that is unclear in the military policy of heads of the CIS. The situation also is aggravated in connection with the withdrawal of groups of forces from countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic. As a result of this, the range of reconnoitering offensive air weapons has been sharply reduced and the time for preparing air defense personnel and equipment to repel massive strikes in western theaters

of military operations has been considerably decreased. New problems arose in connection with a decrease in air space for performing air defense missions on a strategic and operational scale, since groupings of air defense personnel and equipment now are deployed only on CIS territory. The beginning of an air attack can be determined here only based on COMINT and ELINT data, the validity of which sometimes requires clarification. Moreover, a timely scramble of fighter aviation for commitment up to cruise missile launch points is not ensured and main forces of aviation can be committed only from the line along the Dnieper River. Thus there has been a significant growth in the threat of penetration by offensive air weapons into the depth of the country's territory and to defense installations from any sector in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia and from the direction of the Baltic.

Unresolved social problems weigh like a heavy burden and questions of subunit and unit supply and manpower acquisition demand resolution. Reduced-strength and cadre subunits have not justified their purpose. Just what is to be done? Let us attempt to delve into it!

On the one hand, it is necessary to create an anti-aircraft and antimissile defense of CIS countries, but against what potential enemy? Especially as outlays of billions will be required for creating it.

On the other hand, Russia and the United States are devoted to a course of reducing their strategic forces and general purpose forces, including air groupings in Europe and other regions of the globe. Manufacture and procurement of cruise missiles are being reduced. And the other states with which conflicts (economic, political) are possible for us have considerably lesser capabilities for conducting air campaigns. The NATO air grouping in Europe is being reduced at the same time.

In our view, it is necessary to immediately begin a reform of defensive doctrine and spell out in it the role and place of the aerospace echelon and of air defense forces.

Further, do we need a unified air defense (aerospace defense) system of Commonwealth countries or will each state resolve these questions independently?

And finally, by what method are missions of anti-aircraft and antimissile defense of Russia and other CIS states and missions of monitoring air space use to be accomplished?

The essence of many ideas being put forth at the present time reduces to solving these problems only by the political route and at the same time creating a national air defense system of each state individually and a system of European and American-Russian security, which will permit creating an air defense system at the lowest level of sufficiency and in a number of cases reducing it only to monitoring air space use. We agree, but our world is rather unstable and contradictory for following such a path, and the United States does not plan to give up the superpower role.

We believe that ABM defense and anti-aircraft defense is necessary for our cooperation. And only missions of discovering the beginning of combat employment of aerospace attack weapons against one country or groups of countries is possible within the framework of a European and an American-Russian system.

Under present conditions it is impossible to speak of the defensive capability of a state or armed forces without air defense. The Persian Gulf war and local wars and conflicts of recent decades are vivid examples of this. Groupings of personnel and equipment in the air defense system of the country and armed forces should be deployed with consideration of expected operations by any potential air enemy. The condition of combat readiness of air defense personnel and equipment must correspond to the military-political situation. And if there is no danger of an aerospace attack being initiated against the CIS, then the condition of combat readiness also should not be burdensome for states and troops. It is advisable to carry out a reduction of Air Defense Forces by phases, supporting real combat effectiveness of air defense personnel and equipment in permanent-readiness subunits and units and taking a solicitous attitude toward cadres.

But no one wins in creating independent air defense systems of Commonwealth states. Why?

FIRST OF ALL, the unified air defense system created with outlays of billions, the need for which is obvious to the majority of specialists, disintegrates.

Inasmuch as personnel and equipment of the missile-space defense and missile attack warning system are on the territory of the majority of Commonwealth states, its functioning is fundamentally possible only within the scope of a unified aerospace defense system.

If the Baltic states, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia will not participate in the unified air defense system, the range of reconnoitering the air enemy will be reduced for Russia by 1,000-1,500 km and more, and the lower boundary of the radar field will rise 2-3 times compared with that required. The air boundaries from the western sector and southern sectors essentially will remain open, and everything must be created anew.

A precise position is necessary in doctrinal provisions. Is a conflict among CIS states possible, and which of them will not become part of the unified air defense system? And these data must be made the basis of principles for creating air defense force groupings. For the time being all modern assets of fighter aviation, SAM troops, radiotechnical troops and EW previously deployed along the outer borders of the former USSR are under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, Belarus and other states, while the primary defense installations of the Povolzhye, Urals and central economic area do not have a modern SAM cover (with a trebling of capabilities of offensive air weapons).

At the same time, air defense personnel and equipment of Ukraine, Belarus and other CIS states will not be able to separately repel massive strikes from air and space. They also are in no condition to prevent a penetration by air

strike elements to the boundaries of Russia and primary defense installations within the boundaries of their republics.

SECONDLY, there is disruption of the system of procurements, equipment and arms repair, officer personnel training, and use of combat employment centers of SAM troops and fighter aviation, which are deployed in various republics.

In particular, with a rupture of the economic and political alliance and disruption of deliveries of aviation technical equipment, aviation will begin flying in all CIS republics in a few months.

Thus in order to substantiate changes in methods of accomplishing CIS air defense missions it is necessary to take a position as to the axes on which to concentrate main efforts of aviation, SAM troops and reconnaissance and receive an answer on principles of creating aerospace defense.

Under conditions of a changing military-political situation, economic crisis in the CIS and a reduction in numerical strength of armed forces and defense appropriations, it is possible to ensure the security of each independent state and especially Russia only with strategic and operational unity of air defense forces and unified command and control of them. It is advisable to modernize the unified air defense system and transform it into a unified aerospace defense system of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

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Problem of Restoring Damaged Pieces of ZRV Armament Acquires New Content

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PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian
No 7-8, 92 (signed to press 7 Jul 92) pp 28-30

[Article by Col N. Dukin, candidate of military sciences, docent: "Problem of Restoring Damaged Pieces of ZRV Armament Acquires New Content"]

[Text] The reduction in Air Defense [PVO] Troops called for by the military reform is planned to be carried out by decreasing the number of strike systems. Thus, the gap in the correlation of spending for strike, controlling, and supporting subsystems throughout the PVO structure (and in the Antiaircraft Missile Troops [ZRV] in particular) will increase even more. Is this right? Let us turn to experts' prognoses and the experience of distributing the total military expenditures of the U.S. Department of Defense over specific-purpose items, which are shown in the table.

Note. Data in the table include all items of the military budget of the Department of Defense, except for expenditures on items of this department's civilian budget for engineer forces and other types of military activities.

Total Military Expenditures of the U.S. Department of Defense for Specific-Purpose Items in Fiscal Years 1984-1990
(in millions of dollars)

Fiscal Year	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Total	220,928	245,154	265,480	273,966	281,935	289,800	293,821
Procurement of armament and military equipment (aircraft, helicopters, guided missiles, ships, weapons, etc.)	61,879	70,381	76,517	80,744	77,166	80,651	78,711
Operation and maintenance	67,388	72,376	75,288	76,205	84,475	85,394	88,673

Thus, expenditures for operation and maintenance of U.S. arms and military equipment are comparable to the spending for its procurement. This makes it possible to increase considerably the combat readiness of arms and create a mobile and highly productive system of repairing battle damage that has been tested during local wars and armed conflicts. Eliminating the imbalance in the correlation of strike, controlling, and supporting subsystems in the ZRV in conditions of conducting military reform, in our view, is the use of the assets freed in the process of reducing offensive arms of the Ground Forces to improve controlling and supporting subsystems of the Air Defense Forces as strictly defensive weapons.

Today, there has been a sharp increase in the combat capabilities of offensive air weapons for suppressing air defense installations and troops. On the other hand, the design of joint models of ZRV armament has become quite complex; they all are saturated with a large number of vitally important systems. The high density of positioning assemblies, blocks, and units increases the likelihood of serious damage to systems in the event they are hit by missile or shell fragments. All this can lead to an increase in expected battle losses of ZRV arms and an increase in heavy and serious damage. Therefore, in modern conditions of conducting combat operations, the problem of restoring damaged pieces of armament takes on a new content.

The existing system of restoration of ZRV armament needs improvement. The structure of repair bodies must ensure that the actual capabilities for repairing armament correspond to what is required and be flexible and able to change depending on the composition of the armament of the grouping, its place in the disposition of forces, the availability of a local industrial base and the ability to use it to restore disabled armament during the course of combat operations.

Let us recall the already largely forgotten experience of the combat employment of air defense assets during the Great Patriotic War. It shows that when creating a technical reserve, it is possible to assign to the reserve anti-aircraft missile systems from a grouping and create a reserve by means of additionally assigned anti-aircraft missile systems. By the start of the Great Patriotic War there was no reserve of air defense assets, which had a disastrous effect in the initial period of the war. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command [VGK] did not correct this mistake until a year later. A transition from fragmented to massed employment of anti-aircraft artillery in battlefield air defense in 1942. This became possible thanks to the appearance of army anti-aircraft artillery regiments and anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the VGK reserve.

The composition of the specially assigned armament of the reserve not used during peacetime may include both anti-aircraft missiles of the old park being freed in the process of upgrading the ZRV and new (if there is a sufficient number) anti-aircraft missile systems. The following tactics could be employed when using the technical reserve of anti-aircraft missiles: using individual or combined launch sites as a part of the grouping; creating a concealed reserve anti-aircraft missile fire plan as a part of the grouping; employing a anti-aircraft missile fire plan of new concealed groupings of the ZRV.

Combat employment of the technical reserve makes it possible to accomplish a number of tactical missions, the main ones which are: restoring the disrupted anti-aircraft missile fire plan; expanding the capabilities of the grouping for combating aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, anti-radar missiles, and jammers; increasing camouflage, survivability, and stability of the anti-aircraft missile defense; reinforcing existing groupings on the most likely (disclosed) axes of operations by offensive air weapons; achieving superiority over the air enemy and changing the course of combat operations in one's favor; accomplishing newly arising tasks.

As the experience of combat employment of the ZRV in local wars and armed conflicts has shown, mobile technical reserves using half-track prime movers, rail cars and flat cars, and seagoing and river vessels can play a large role in supporting the maneuver of armament, its concentration, dispersal, and reinforcement. In each specific case, the choice of transport will depend on the degree of development of its various types and the network of communication routes in the regions. When selecting the deployment areas of the mobile technical reserve, it is necessary to adhere to the following basic principles: designate this area as close as possible to the units and subunits being supported; make maximum use of the protective features of the terrain; and avoid setting up in large populated areas and near installations that may become targets for enemy air strikes. The basis for deployment of mobile reserves should be created during peacetime.

One source of the technical reserve is the spare parts kits. A discussion on this topic on the pages of this journal showed that the existing system of accounting for and filling out the kits is inconvenient for the users, outdated, and needs improvement.

The experience of using spare parts kits for U.S. Air Force armament and also theoretical calculations make it possible to recommend basic principles for filling out the kits. First, it is necessary to fill out the kits with enlarged, pre-tested, and tuned assemblies, blocks, and units, that is, abandon the practice of filling it out with individual parts. This will make it possible to reduce the time for restoring damaged pieces

and decrease nonproductive time expenditures and also the volume of "nomenclators." Second, it is advisable to include in the composition of the kits elements taking into account not only statistics on wear and malfunctions during the process of operation, but also the structure of the anticipated combat losses, at least during the initial period of combat operations. Such an approach will ensure restoration of armament during that period without replenishing the spare parts kits, particularly for those units which are located a long distance from the central supply agencies and manufacturers of the armament. Third, it is best to place the kits in standard containers that ensure that they can be carried by all types of transport and packed in supply-dropping crates. Implementing this principle of filling out the kits will make it possible to reduce the delivery time at all levels and, consequently, the time for restoration of armament.

During the course of combat operations, ZRV armament can be repaired by using only component parts of the spare parts kits, rebuilding the armament, or by a mixed method. The experience of repairing armament of the Vietnamese People's Army gives us examples of using the method of rebuilding when restoring armament. Antiaircraft missile systems were put together from destroyed equipment of several subunits, and field repairs were made to these systems using serviceable assemblies and units taken from armament that could not be restored. In our view, the mixed method will be most widely used. This uses both component parts from the spare parts kits and serviceable and dismantled pieces of the same type that are not subject to restoration.

Standardization of components is one way to reduce the time for restoration of armament. In addition to the purely economic advantages, this creates conditions for accomplishing a broad maneuver of forces and assets when restoring armament of different types.

In a combat situation, restoration of armament is also possible using short cuts, in which a number of labor-intensive operations (for example, painting) not affecting the quality of the combat employment of the armament are eliminated. But to do this, it is necessary to draw up special "Manuals" for conducting repairs for each model of armament, above all for those that are the most mobile and have the highest combat capabilities. These "Manuals" must specify the possible typical damages and methods and sequence of correcting them.

The bulk of the time lost in restoration of ZRV armament is associated with conducting technical reconnaissance and evacuating damaged pieces to the repair site and returning them to the battle formations. It is possible to reduce the time spent on technical reconnaissance by using not only data from the technical observation posts and groups, but also information available at headquarters and obtained as a result of a careful study of large-scale maps, photographic documents, handbooks, questioning local residents, and information from local authorities. The evacuation (delivery) time of armament can be reduced provided there is a reduction in time for planning and making decisions, maintaining transports in working order, and comprehensive use of all types of transport. It is also necessary to maintain evacuation (delivery) routes in passable condition, provide

reliable security for columns en route and in the armament loading (unloading) areas, and achieve continuity of command and control.

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What Is an EKS, or How To Avoid Hitting Friendlies in Combat


93UM0006A Moscow VESTNIK

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[Article by Col A. Koblov, service student at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces: "What Is an EKS, or How To Avoid Hitting Friendlies in Combat"]

[Text] The problem of coordination between aviation and air defense antiaircraft missile troops [ZRV PVO], as well as antiaircraft missile forces, antiaircraft artillery, and other air defense assets of the branches of service remains one of the most complex problems today. Its essence is in the need to achieve maximum effectiveness when destroying enemy offensive air weapons and in ensuring the safety of friendly aviation in the kill zones of air defense weapons.

Let us try to divide the airspace into areas of coordination. In one area, aviation operates without restriction, in another—ZRV, and the third is an area of joint operations. In turn, it is divided into areas of space in which air targets are destroyed by either ZRV or aviation. As a result, we end up with a complicated, practically non-dynamic system that can operate effectively only in the event of a fixed location of air defense assets in the grouping. When mobile antiaircraft missile systems were put into service, including those capable of firing on the move, coordination in combat became even more complicated due to the simultaneous movement of ZRV weapons on the ground and aviation in the airspace. Even a slight change in the location of air defense weapons makes it necessary to update the sectors of space in the area of coordination. Each air defense weapon of the branches of service must be notified of this as quickly as possible, which will be quite difficult in conditions of electronic countermeasures and massive jamming.



There are a number of difficulties in organizing coordination of ZRV and aviation with decentralized command and

control. In this case, especially when carrying out missions that arise suddenly, there can be a real danger not only of letting targets pass but also of hitting friendly aircraft.

In penetrating an air defense system in narrow sectors, the enemy may create a density of the raid that exceeds the ZRV's capabilities to resist, and commanders of ZRV units, not having aviation control points at their command posts, end up being unable to organize coordination and assume the task of target allocation. This, in turn, does not make it possible to create the necessary correlation of forces on important axes or areas of air defense penetration.

To solve the problems enumerated above, one can propose a number of directions which will subsequently require detailed calculations.

To organize coordination, it seems advisable to introduce the concept and use in the armed forces an integrated encoded coordination grid (EKS). The EKS is a spatial structure designed for organizing coordination and consisting of grid squares which are characterized by fixed dimensions in the horizontal plane and variable values in the vertical plane and have a legend. For example, to indicate the location of a weapon, it is sufficient to transmit over any type of communications using an established signal (command) the name of the grid square for ZRV or (with the addition of an altitude range) for aviation. This will make it possible in the process of conducting combat operations to exchange mutual information on the location (including planned location) and nature of operations of both ZRV and aviation. Thus, it will be possible to update decisions made for target destruction and with high reliability preclude unintentional fire against friendly forces.

In order to maximize the combat capabilities of aviation and ZRV and increase flight safety in the zone of joint operations, we should implement and use the concept of echelon of combat employment of aviation (EBPA)—a portion of the airspace set aside for conduct of combat operations by friendly aviation in the area of coordination. Designated based on the capabilities of aviation armament and the actual situation at hand, it will enable aircraft located in the area of coordination to destroy hostile aircraft in the entire range of altitudes and speeds of combat employment.

To accomplish tasks of target allocation and create the necessary correlation of forces on important axes with decentralized command and control, it is necessary to equip the command posts of ZRV units with aviation control point or (where this is impossible) organize direct communications channels with nearby observation posts. It is also advisable to make it the responsibility of ZRV unit commanders to accomplish target allocation between ZRV and aviation and command and control of combat operations for destroying offensive air weapons in the area of joint operations. In this case, the combat capabilities of the ZRV grouping are built up through additional fire channels, the role of which aviation plays.

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CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Problems in Rear Service Support for Aviation Missiles

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PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian
No 9, 92 (signed to press 29 Jul 92) pp 35-37

[Article by Major V. Zagaynov under rubric "Maintenance of Arms and Equipment": "There Are Many Valuable Guidance Instructions and Even More Valuable Guidance Instructions," But No One to Carry Them Out"]

[Text] This is what a practical engineer believes. It seems to make no sense to object to him, but something has to be done, and the author suggests it.

A shortage of common sense in special technical and rear service support for aviation forced me to bring my thoughts before the readers' court relative to missile technical support for air defense fighter aviation.

Problems and contradictions objectively existing in missile technical support often become reasons for fires and explosions at missile depots and storage areas and also for large numbers of missile failures and breakdowns, which leads to expenditures of enormous funds for their repair.

Just what are the basic contradictions of missile technical support and wherein lies their essence and ways of resolution from the viewpoint of a practical engineer? The first (and main) contradiction is between the existing table of organization structure of subunits of the aviation engineering service and the aviation rear engaged in maintaining missile weaponry and the volume of work actually needed to ensure combat readiness, reliability and safety of the units of fire of aviation units. Calculations show that at the present time the volume of mandatory work (specified in documents) for servicing aviation missiles exceeds existing labor inputs by 2-4 times. There has been a growth in the number of armament models maintained in units and an increase in the volume of monitoring and inspection equipment and technological equipment in the last ten years as a result of aircraft modernization. And at the same time the numerical strength of personnel has been cut almost in half over the very same time period according to absolutely incomprehensible laws. Diesel generator maintenance specialists have disappeared from tables of organization and there are two or three (and sometimes more) motor vehicles for one driver. In some places there are no crane operators in the table of organization. The rear service for missile storage and maintenance is incapable of performing any kind of work to maintain missiles in storage. An enormous amount of work of keeping a considerable territory in serviceable condition falls on a few persons. If we add numerous details and jobs to this, it becomes understandable that at times there is no one at the depots for weeks. What is in surplus are guidance documents, but unfortunately there is no one to fulfill their requirements.

Another contradiction is between the personnel training level and the growing complexity of armament and special equipment. This especially concerns first-term service personnel. There are a number of reasons here. First of all, there is in general a chronic lack of enlisted men now.

Considering those same details and jobs, there can be no mention even of any kind of planned technical training for mechanics. Thus the mechanics' work falls on officers and warrant officers. No one will be surprised any longer by the fact that the engineer opens and closes hatches during the day. The officer simply has no time for independent training. What is most alarming is the drop in officers' professionalism and qualification.

If we speak of rear service specialists, it is deeply regrettable that the concept of technical and special training is absent there. In the best instance depot chiefs know the external appearance of equipment and excerpts from maintenance instructions. But "jacks-of-all-trades" from security subunits are used to perform very extensive jobs at depots. Hence the rather frequent infractions of safety measures, breakdowns and even emergencies.

All this leads to where personnel of the regiment and separate airfield maintenance battalion are incapable of fulfilling a number of jobs regulated by guidance documents and instructions. And inasmuch as "it is impossible to embrace the unembraceable," a portion of the work has to be sacrificed by determining what is important and what is not very important according to one's own understanding. And the simple logic is strengthened in people's awareness that it is possible not to fulfill requirements of documents and instructions, and any shortcomings and omissions in service already are justified by arguments about a lack of personnel and the difficulties of logistic support.

Just what is to be done?

Above all it is necessary to bring the table of organization structure of regimental and rear service missile technical support subunits into line with actual labor inputs. It is necessary to revise the makeup of specialists and replace positions and first-term servicemen with warrant officers and employees. Automotive equipment and diesel generator specialists should be introduced to tables of organization. It is necessary to create a document (even though it be one more) regulating missile technical support and especially the division of functions of rear service and regimental subunits in this process. There are many contradictions and reservations in existing documents, and rather frequently the rear service works according to its documents and the aviation engineering service according to its documents.

Another way is to create qualitatively new missile technical support structures. The missile servicing and preparation system is outmoded. It was formed in the period of second-generation jet aircraft, when the first guided missiles appeared. The aircraft unit of fire consisted of a maximum of four missiles of the same type, which comprised 3-5 percent of the aircraft's overall takeoff weight.

At the present time a fighter-interceptor can carry up to ten missiles of four varieties and the relative weight of armament reaches 15-20 percent. A railroad car is needed to carry the unit of fire of a pair of fighters. Complexity of missile armament also has grown immeasurably. The high mobility of aviation, rigid time standards of combat readiness and features of fighter aviation tactics impose their own requirements on the structure of missile technical support subunits, i.e., objective premises exist requiring a cardinal resolution of missile technical support questions.

There also are seemingly enough subjective premises. There are more than enough different proposals and opinions on a change in structure. Already long ago, rear service commanders have been proposing to transfer their armament services to the aviation engineering service. They do not regret this, since a substantial part of responsibility for safety and combat readiness is transferred together with a small part of the rear service. But the engineers are not taking the armament service on themselves because they know that with the existing organization the responsibility will be given up immediately, but it will take them a very long time to get appropriate authority.

There also are opposite opinions. It is proposed to give the regimental missile preparation teams to the rear service. Let everything be in the same hands, they say, and the aviation engineering service will become "lighter" and more mobile. True, soberminded people understand that under present conditions this will lead to the professional "death" of these subunits, since they will have to fully share the difficult service of the separate airfield maintenance battalion.

In analyzing the logistic support missions arising for the separate airfield maintenance battalion in the conduct of combat operations, it is possible to presume an aggravation of a number of other contradictions such as, for example, between the vastness of missions and capabilities of rear service subunits or between the mobile nature of combat operations of aviation and in principle the fixed nature of work of the separate airfield maintenance battalion. This supposition is based on the fact that in conducting combat readiness inspections under "hothouse" conditions of peacetime the separate airfield maintenance battalion rather often does not have time for missile technical support. Either there are no people or no equipment. But if it is necessary to transfer just a portion of the unit of fire from one unit to another, it is necessary to activate almost all motor transport of the separate airfield maintenance battalion.

I will note that the table of organization structures of fourth-generation aircraft missile preparation teams fundamentally are arranged almost ideally. If difficulties do arise, they are connected most often either with being understrength in personnel (especially first-term personnel) or with a considerable separation of specialists from their immediate duties. Consolidating regimental and rear services into a single subunit is another question. I am more inclined to believe that this subunit must be part of the aviation engineering service. Only in this case is it possible to ensure a high level of professionalism and interworking with combat subunits.

What will such a detachment do?

First of all, support air regiment combat operations, i.e., prepare aviation missiles in storage and under fixed and field conditions for combat use. Supporting the maneuver of the air regiment or its subunits also should be included here.

A number of questions immediately arise here which demand fundamental resolution: either the subunit table of organization structure should support preparation of missiles as a minimum at two airfields with its own forces, or it is necessary to bring in reinforcements from regimental subunits and the rear service for missile preparation.

Another problem is connected with this one—the correlation of wartime and peacetime tables of organization. If one proceeds from principles of a professional army, then the missile technical support subunit should support air regiment combat operations without additional deployment and mobilization. But for now it is a different matter. To perform our missions we are forced to bring in considerable forces from other subunits and units and in wartime to place great hopes on reservists, whose training demands a separate serious discussion.

The second mission is to maintain a given level of reliability of aviation missiles and keep them in a serviceable, combat-ready condition. It is unnecessary to think up anything fundamentally new here. The existing system of maintenance and the inspection systems in the inventory permit performing this mission successfully.

In our view, along with capabilities for inspecting, repairing and transporting missiles a unified missile technical support subunit also must have realistic forces for keeping depots, storage areas and base grounds in serviceable condition and ensuring safety during storage. If the talk turns now to plowing security zones or cutting grass, the impression is created that these tasks are fundamentally unfulfillable, and this despite the fact that any separate airfield maintenance battalion has an airfield service with considerable capabilities but with a total absence of responsibility for the condition of storage areas and depot grounds.

Things are almost the same with maintenance and repair of special vehicles. Aviation Engineering Service Manual-78 implies that this work is done by the separate airfield maintenance battalion motor vehicle maintenance unit. Unfortunately I do not know of a single such example in more than ten years of service in the aviation engineering service. One automatically begins thinking about common sense. If the position chief does not have his own motor vehicle specialists, then there is no need to speak of subunit combat readiness.

Now a so-called base system of organizing the aviation engineering service and rear service is being discussed. The consolidated missile technical support service fits very well in such a structure as a missile technical support detachment or battalion subordinate directly to the base commander. If we rest on the concept of aviation engineering troops set forth by Major General Ishutko, the creation of separate missile technical support battalions servicing the division or corps air base area would be sensible in such a structure. In this case separate missile servicing and storage companies are disposed at units' main airfields. The battalion headquarters and the technical maintenance and transport facility is at one of the airfields. According to calculations, in this case there is a significant drop in operating expenditures for upkeep of units of fire. Qualitatively new missile repair capabilities are created.

Footnotes

1. Military jargon.

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Procuracy Findings on Implementation of Housing Laws

93UM0089A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Col Justice Leonid Smertin, Main Directorate for Surveillance Over Implementation of Laws in the Armed Forces, and Maj Ivan Ivanyuk: "Until the Apartment Shortage Is Corrected, We Will Have to Endure a Shortage of Fairness: From the Findings of a Procuracy Inspection"]

[Text] There are few people left today who doggedly insist on leveling in everything. Little by little the society is ridding itself of social parasitism, reviving the individual's self-reliance. Nonetheless, we feel that whatever the conditions, two components of social fairness will remain unchanged—lawfulness and morality.

These criteria are especially important in military collectives, where the concepts of duty and honor are focused onto fulfillment of daily missions, where everything is regulated down to the finest details, and the principle of distribution prevails in social support. The concept of social fairness is even more important to servicemen because they often carry out their duties in extreme conditions, and they count on an adequate reward for their labor.

All of this was once again confirmed by an inspection of how well the requirements of housing legislation are being fulfilled in the army and navy. It was conducted by the Main Directorate for Surveillance Over Implementation of Laws in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation's General Procuracy (this is now the name of the former Main Military Procuracy).

As we know, the housing problem is especially acute in the army and navy. In recent times Russian President B. Yeltsin, the government and the Ministry of Defense have been taking active steps to solve it. But very much had been left to its own devices in the past in this area, and moreover, there are factors today that are complicating the situation. For example the withdrawal of troops from outside Russia. Under such conditions distribution of housing strictly based on rules of law currently in effect and establishment of an atmosphere of objectivity and an interest in the fate of each individual are doubtlessly acquiring priority significance.

Unfortunately, as the procuracy inspection showed, these principles are often violated. In the Kapustin Yar garrison for example, while 82 military families had no housing and 500 required an improvement in their housing conditions, 44 apartments were put up for rent by different organizations. A similar fact was revealed in the Kirov garrison, where with the knowledge of the garrison chief and the chief of the rayon's housing operation administration, housing directorate chief A. Kuchinskiy extended the leases of four residential buildings with a total area of over 500 square meters held by civilian organizations.

And consider the cost of the unique "record" set by Lieutenant Colonel V. Berednikov, chief of the Chelyabinskiy Rayon Housing Operation Administration. Following the "exclusionary rule," he allocated—on the basis of fictitious documents at that—13 apartments to his subordinates, and transferred six apartments to outside organizations unlawfully as well. Now there's a real landlord for you. Criminal

proceedings were instituted against this "efficient" housing operation administration chief.

At the same time, while some are literally being driven to despair by their lack of housing, housing with all of the amenities is being given away to "influential" people having no relationship to the Ministry of Defense. And there are cases where apartments are left vacant for months at a time for no reason other than for such "unforeseen" cases. For example 17 unoccupied apartments were discovered by the inspection in the Moscow Air Defense District. Similar facts were revealed in the Baltic Fleet, and in the Volga and Ural military districts.

Of course, violations in allocating and distributing housing could have been significantly fewer in number, had the housing commissions of the military units, organizations and institutions approached their work more conscientiously, ethically and lawfully. Oftentimes it would have been enough, after all, to carefully check proffered documents to make sure that an unscrupulous person would not have his way, and that an apartment would be assigned to the person who truly needs it more than anyone else. Then it would have been impossible for Major General V. Mirenkov, chief of the military department of a certain Moscow VUZ, to conceal his possession of living space in St. Petersburg and obtain a three-room apartment in Moscow for himself, his wife and university-bound son, who, being registered in two cities simultaneously, was able to subsequently privatize the apartment in the "northern" capital.

Colonel G. Chulkin, former commander of a certain military construction unit, might have been diverted from unlawful practices as well. He simply forged his family certificate, adding two more persons to it, and immediately the living space in the apartment he received "jumped" to 56 square meters, and his total space increased to 115.

Unfortunately, these and many other similar facts went unnoticed by the housing commissions. Sometimes out of carelessness, sometimes in response to instructions from the command, and at other times because of a reluctance to delve into the needs of people. People whose poor living conditions make them willing to take a desperate step.

In a certain military unit of the Moscow Air Defense District of which Colonel S. Petranyuk is the commander, Lieutenant Colonel V. Fetisov suddenly experienced an improvement in his housing conditions without any legal

basis. At the same time the housing commission rejected a petition to improve housing conditions for Warrant Officer I. Erkeyev, whose family, which consisted of four persons, was crowded into a single room with an area of around 13 square meters. What the motive for such a decision was, is unclear. After that, in retaliation Erkeyev's family seized, in violation of the law, a vacant apartment allocated to the garrison.

Cases of servicemen seizing housing for themselves have not been all that rare recently (they have occurred in the Orenburg, Kazan and other garrisons). Some people are ready to break the law because besides everything else, housing uniquely guarantees a secure future for the serviceman. This is why any deviation from the rules of law in distributing housing is perceived especially intolerably by the people.

As we know, the Russian president and the government published a number of documents aimed at improving the supply of housing to servicemen. And we, the military, are actively confronting local soviets of people's deputies and executive organs with our demands based on these documents. And this is the right thing to do: Ultimately, the fairest thing in this matter would probably be for every officer and for every shore-based and seagoing warrant officer to have his own apartment, and to have firm state guarantees of housing. But unfortunately, we are still far from this ideal, which is probably why such savage battles are fought during meetings of housing commissions trying to apportion one or two apartments allocated for the needs of the 15 or 20 who need them. What sort of fairness can there be here?

But while justifiably awaiting assistance from the state, nonetheless we need to finally put our own house in order as well. It's time to take a critical look at the "package" of departmental guidelines on housing: Some have long been obsolete, and others require correction. We need to make a more attentive examination of the work of housing commissions and of their membership: Are these organs really staffed by the most honest, principled people who know the law and observe it to the letter? And then at least complaints of various sorts of violations in distributing housing will decrease in number, and people waiting for apartments will know for certain that order and observance of the law are guaranteed.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Withdrawal of 107th Division From Vilnius

93UM0091A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Valeriy Gromak and Vladimir Maryukha:
"Orders Issued to Leave Before Summer: The 107th Division Abandons Vilnius"]

[Text] The bus barely crawled toward the airport. The passengers were late, and they urged the elderly Lithuanian driver on, but he could only shrug his shoulders: Overtaking the column of armored personnel carriers bearing Russian flags and traveling to the loading platform was a rather difficult thing to do. On learning why the bus was moving so slowly, the passengers calmed down. Some of them looked at the Russian military vehicles with unconcealed delight: "They're finally leaving, the invaders," while others watched them with repressed sadness and anxiety: "What's going to happen next?"

But whatever the thoughts of the bus passengers and passers-by were as they watched the column of APCs, there was one obvious provable fact: The 107th Motorized Rifle Division was leaving Vilnius, the capital of the Lithuanian Republic. To be more precise, the capital was being abandoned not so much by the division as by what was left of it. When the 107th joins the Moscow Military District, it will do so at brigade strength.

This formation has long been the "trump card" of Lithuanian politicians, who assert that Western businessmen, knowing that Russian forces were but a skip and a jump from the republic's parliament, were supposedly fearful of investing money into the Lithuanian economy. But now, Vitautas Landsbergis feels that the documents signed in Moscow on 8 September calling for withdrawal of the forces from the republic were "a great accomplishment in the development of interstate relations between Lithuania and Russia."

Well, what can we say? The Lithuanians have reason to be happy, which is something you can't say about the emotions of the Russians. Many feel that Russian diplomacy was the loser here, that it was unable to properly defend the interests of the servicemen, and to hold out for a later withdrawal date. However, we have to consider the difficult choice faced by both Russian leaders and Russian diplomacy. On one hand time was needed to prepare to receive the troops in Russia. On the other hand circumstances themselves were favoring the Lithuanians. Without a young complement, the military units are melting literally before our eyes, and it is hard to determine what is better—to let them dissolve altogether, or to withdraw them before it's too late. The roots of these problems lead down into the distant past, because the "process went into motion" a good five years ago. Consequently if the division doesn't leave by summer, there will be nothing left to lead out.

Half of the wall of the office occupied by Colonel Valeriy Frolov, who is still the commander of the 107th division, is covered by a timetable for disbanding the division and forming and sending off the brigade. Judging from the diagram, when it comes to withdrawing equipment and property the matter is generally clear. But there are complexities in moving the families. The first train left for the

Moscow region on 21 September. Six families left together with property and equipment to the new place of service.

They were met without insult, without reproaches, though the redeploying regiment did find itself in rather cramped quarters. The new arrivals were given a hotel to serve as housing, and Senior Lieutenant Sergey Shcherbinin, commander of one of the arriving companies, feels that he was extremely lucky. For three years of service in Vilnius, after graduating from military school, he and his family lived right in headquarters. And here he had a separate room, his own roof, albeit temporary. Until the housing problems of officers and their families were solved, the attitude toward the division's withdrawal was completely different. At a general meeting of the unit, Major Vladimir Belov, commander of an artillery subunit, read the decision of the Officers' Assembly to boycott the withdrawal and to refuse to dispatch the trains. He was supported by officers from other units as well.

Emotions are what they are. They often spill over the edge in some other units undergoing withdrawal, growing into menacing accusations and into organization of highly publicized actions such as appeals to the Constitutional Court. But problems of this sort can't be solved by declarations. What they require is efficient and coordinated work by all services of the Ministry of Defense to reduce the painfulness of the inevitable process, so that even in today's extreme conditions of accelerated withdrawal the optimum decisions as to how to introduce some certainty into the fate of the people as quickly as possible could be found. It may be said that the situation of the 107th division is instructive in this aspect: This certainty already exists here. In any case each officer knows that he is being awaited in the Moscow region or the Western Group of Forces, or that he is to be discharged into the reserves and provided housing in a particular place and on a particular date. The latter (there are around 70 of them) have been promised that over the course of the year they will get apartments in Russia; housing is being erected with money obtained from selling surplus military equipment and property.

But the technical problems of withdrawing the division and of fulfilling the tight redeployment schedule have been piled primarily upon the shoulders of officers and warrant officers. Another train leaves every three days. And if we consider that the division is now left with only 7 percent of the required number of compulsory-service personnel, the size of this burden becomes clear. The newspaper LETUVOS RITAS did not pass up this opportunity to put salt in the wounds: Before, it said, it was not felt to be entirely proper for an officer to wield a shovel or a sledge hammer in the presence of persons of lower rank.

"Let them write," the division commander smiled, "we are not ashamed before our subordinates. It is because of this agonizing effort by the officers that we are able to stay on schedule."

The Lithuanian parliament has even noticed the latter. "The withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania is proceeding in sufficiently organized fashion, and special mention should be made of the fact that the former 107th division has already begun leaving Vilnius, making the withdrawal official," announced Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet

Chairman V. Landsbergis. Of course he did take the opportunity to throw a barb at the Russian military, saying the following to Valeriy Frolov at a meeting of the division command with representatives of the republic's parliament: "I will come to your sendoff with flowers, Mr. Colonel...." The reply of the Russian colonel was in the same spirit: "As a gentleman I will accept the flowers, but I won't put them in a vase."

There are many reasons for such a response, and one of them is an attempt by Landsbergis himself to discredit the already accelerated withdrawal of the division. In his words (this is fully explainable in the time of an election campaign in the republic) some unit commanders supposedly received orders to stop the transfer of military facilities to Lithuania.

We will leave this statement to the conscience of Mister Landsbergis, since Russian forces in Lithuania never received any such orders or instructions.

By the way, it seems as if deliberate stirring of passions regarding the withdrawal has recently abated. Lithuanian railroaders who used to supply broken-down rail cars and customs officials who used to "lock" the border after 1700 are putting up practically no more obstacles. Of course such actions did require Colonel V. Frolov to speak directly to Audrius Butkivicius, the Lithuanian security minister: "If you want us to leave faster, then don't put sticks in the spokes." Now it has become possible to "pull these sticks out" with a simple telephone call. But this does not mean that there are no more problems. There are enough of them in the internal life of the departing division, and in the fate of each specific serviceman leaving Severnyy Post, which he had come to love so much, and in many other matters.

And in Severnyy Post, you see the same well-kept drill pad, the simple displays reflecting the battle road of the 107th division, which was ending its existence in its present form, and the T-34 on its pedestal, which the trucks, APCs, and trailered tanks passed with their motors roaring on the way to the gate. The 107th division is leaving Lithuania. The first to leave....

Problems of Withdrawal of 3rd Guards from Baltic

93UM0087A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Valeriy Gromak, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Troops Must Be Withdrawn from the Baltic Only to Built-Up Places: Do Not Whip Up Passions, But Seek Optimum Solutions"]

[Text] Among other military units which must be withdrawn from Lithuania is the Baltic Fleet 3rd Guards Coast Defense Division, which is to rebase from Klaypeda to Kaliningrad Oblast.

I have had repeated occasion to visit the division. I know that the majority of officers and their families have long been ready to leave Lithuania, which has become a foreign state for them, but the division resembled a seething pot for some time when it was learned about the accelerated withdrawal.

In those days Officer Meetings and assemblies of servicemen's wives took place in all regiments. Members of the women's council traveled to Kaliningrad and Baltic Fleet

headquarters and visited Moscow. The main question was the situation of the servicemen and their families in connection with the accelerated withdrawal of Baltic Fleet forces from Lithuania. The main thing that frightened people was the uncertainty; hence the splashes of emotions. During my presence in the division I heard many various words, including those addressed to higher echelons. Far from all were fair, but it is difficult to demand that people soberly weigh all objective circumstances connected with the troop withdrawal if it is a question of quite specific everyday dramas and a break with the customary way of life... Even now, frankly speaking, officers' families are living under difficult conditions in various training classrooms, previously empty spaces, and in the bath-laundry combine. Three years ago the formation was transferred from the Ground Forces to the Baltic Fleet, but Lithuanian independence soon "arrived" there. At first rather remote time periods for troop withdrawal were named, and naturally every family somehow planned the time of a normal, unhurried departure to the new place of residence and duty. And now the question is natural: What will happen now? How will they be met at the new place? How will they settle in?

Artillery regiment commander Guards Colonel Meshkov told me that he visited the new location in Kaliningrad Oblast earmarked for the regiment's accommodation. With respect to accommodation of equipment, Grigoriy Vasilyevich believes problems will be solved—the neighbors will make room; but with respect to housing, an enlisted men's barracks was set aside locally for the "new settlers" that—excuse me for the details—has one toilet bowl for all families... Officer and warrant officer wives "bristled" on learning about this: we will not go to the barracks in winter! And where are the schools for children in Kaliningrad? Even now Kaliningrad children study in three shifts there...

Of course, all problems with settling in will be possible to solve, but this will take time...

But it is simply impossible to leave the families in Lithuania. In Kaliningrad an officer will receive his state pay in Russian rubles, but in Lithuania it will be its own currency. It is impossible to send money. Going to see the family also is a problem—a visa regime is about to be instituted. And who will guarantee that after the military leave Klaypeda their families will not be subjected to all kinds of infringements of rights, as already has been the case repeatedly in other regions as well?

In the division I was familiarized with a list of questions which the military wish to raise at talks coming soon between the Kaliningrad Oblast administration and the Lithuanian Republic government. It includes giving assistance in an unimpeded departure from Klaypeda (or entry into it) by Russian Army servicemen through customs posts. It is providing the ports of Klaypeda and Palanga for maritime vessels and aircraft capable of accelerating the export of 3rd Guards equipment and property. It also is permitting duty-free export of property of servicemen's families. It is also planned to resolve the question of giving service families an opportunity to live in Klaypeda after 31 August 1993 and allocating funds in Lithuanian currency for social payments to them.

Of course, much does not depend on the military themselves, but that makes it even more important that those

problems which can be solved in one's own home, figuratively speaking, be solved without red tape. Last week I visited the 3rd Guards once again, this time with CinC Baltic Fleet Admiral Vladimir Yegorov.

As the meeting of the CinC in the division showed, the officers and their families rather often demand of the Baltic Fleet leadership that which is beyond the scope of the military department, but at the same time, much also can be done in the Fleet as well. Admiral Yegorov, for example, decided first of all to provide apartments in Kaliningrad Oblast for those who have none in Klaypeda. Forty apartments are being assigned for the tank regiment in Baltiysk and around 30 in Kaliningrad. Of course, that is few for now, but at least some kind of hope has appeared. And in the future all officers should receive apartments in houses which the Lithuanians must build in Kaliningrad...

Yes, this withdrawal of forces from the Baltic is no easy ordeal for our army, and the important thing today is not to allow difficulties which arise in its course to be used to whip up passions. Difficult as it may be, optimum solutions must be sought. In this respect the Ministry of Defense position reflected in a statement being published today is very clear and principled. Now it is important that it be fully implemented by military command and control entities locally. It is not the Army that is withdrawing forces, it is Russia. This cannot be forgotten.

UKRAINE

Morozov on Housing Shortage

93UM0042C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
1 Oct 92 p 1

[Report by Lt Col Vladimir Kamenetskiy: "The Main Problem Is Housing"]

[Text] On 29 September of this year Col Gen Konstantin Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine, met in Kiev with members of the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, representing the 27 oblasts. Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Slepichev, Lt Gen of Militia Valentin Nedraylo, deputy minister of internal affairs, and Maj Gen Vilen Martirosyan were present at the meeting.

"At this stage there are three most important tasks in the field of view of the ministry I head," said Col Gen K. Morozov. "They can be accomplished only with state financing. For example, no public organizations are in a position to provide more than 64,000 apartments for servicemen lacking them and of creating normal conditions for their service."

There are three ways to solve the housing problem, the minister of defense stressed. For one thing, we need to see that the assigned quotas are strictly met by the military construction workers. We are therefore not reducing the construction detachments. On the contrary, we are building them up, supplying them with everything they need and transferring them to the command of the Ministry of Defense. This is already producing positive results. During the first half of this year, for example, the military construction workers released 6,116 apartments, and 3,359 apartments will be built in the third quarter.

In the second place, we must immediately adopt a state program for providing servicemen with housing, since the Ministry of Defense is unable to do this on its own. We have worked out such a program and submitted it to the Cabinet of Ministers. Among other things, it calls for switching to the construction of bungalow-type housing with state financing. The city of Nikolayev has already shown its support for the plan by allocating 200 hectares of land for construction. Around 1,000 comfortable homes can be built on this land.

It is planned to issue 20-year credit for cooperative and individual construction. The military units will repay to the bank 50, 75 and 100 percent of the loans respectively for those who have served 15, 20 and 25 years.

In the third place, servicemen are being provided with housing built on a shared basis with local state administrations, enterprises and organizations. The plans call for around 4,500 apartments to be built under this plan this year.

Money from the Commercial Center of the Ministry of Defense is being channeled into the acquisition of housing.

A total of 1.5 billion rubles was allocated for this purpose for the second half of the year. In Kiev, for example, 150 apartments will be purchased by the end of this year, and 150 during the first quarter of 1993.

The personnel problem is closely linked to the housing problem.

Right now there are more than 20,000 citizens of Ukraine, the minister of defense commented, who want to come home. It is predicted that there will be around 100,000 in the immediate future. And almost none of these people have apartments.

What is being done to provide housing and jobs for them?

Konstantin Petrovich answered this question in the following manner:

"A total of 10,600 officers desiring to serve in other CIS nations have already been transferred out of Ukraine, and 3,356 have been released into the reserve. In the future those who have housing and are entitled to a pension will be released. It is being proposed that the minimum term entitling one to a pension be reduced from 20 years to 10 in order to speed up this process."

Incidentally, the military commissariats have carried out the Decree of the President of Ukraine on the Recomputation of Pensions. Beginning in October, reserve and retired officers and warrant officers will receive considerably more money.

The minister of defense assured representatives of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers that he is striving to get servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine removed from hot spots of the former union and that the newly recruited youth will serve only the people of Ukraine.

In conclusion Col Gen Morozov promised local agents of the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine every kind of support and called upon them to strive tirelessly to see that all commanders and chiefs observe the laws of Ukraine on military matters.

Odessa Military Officer on Desertion

93UM0044A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
16 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with Aleksandr Leonidovich Sidorenko, assistance head of the Kharkov Oblast State Administration and chairman of the oblast induction commission, by Lt Col V. Donskoy, senior officer at the press center of the Odessa Military District, under the rubric "The Problem Demands a Solution": "Patriots Can Handle the Service"]

[Text] The problem of desertion by first-term servicemen from their units has recently become acute in the forces. Soldiers are leaving the barracks and taking off for home, where their parents harbor them and try to find positions for them in units located near their homes. All of this is not only undermining the combat readiness but is also doing significant harm to the prestige of the young Ukrainian army and creating a negative attitude toward the service in the youth. What is causing this phenomenon, and how are local administrative agencies responding to it?

This was the question with which Lt Col V. Donskoy, senior officer at the press center of the Odessa Military District, began his interview with A. Sidorenko, assistant head of the Kharkov Oblast State Administration and chairman of the oblast induction commission.

[Sidorenko] The people have always condemned desertion. When soldiers deserted from the old, imperial army, however, it could be attributed to repressive relations among military personnel and to the immorality and lawlessness which prevailed in the totalitarian society. Today, when a sovereign state is being created and its armed forces are being formed, we view cases of desertion with anger and resentment. The young Ukrainian state's army must not be one from which personnel desert. And this shameful phenomenon must be stamped out as rapidly as possible.

[Donskoy] Before treating an illness, though, one needs to make a correct diagnosis and ascertain the causes of the disease. What are the causes?

[Sidorenko] In accordance with the Law of Ukraine on Universal Military Duty and the Military Service, we are now drafting mainly graduates of regular schools and PTUs [vocational and technical schools]. That group of draftees from among VUZ [higher educational institution] and tekhnikum students which we had a few years ago always formed the backbone of every military collective. We do not have that group as such today. The situation has also been affected by the system of deferments written into the new law.

And so, young people with inadequate education and culture—sometimes simply with no upbringing at all—are entering the army. They do not change their habits and proclivities after donning the uniform. Deficiencies in the youth's upbringing in the family and the school or vocational and technical school manifest themselves.

Unfortunately, parents and the public have always viewed the military more as a school for completing the youth's upbringing. It is not surprising that we have a folk saying: "The army will make a man out of you." That is, it has always been regarded as an institution for providing that which the parents and teachers failed to provide. Today we

want an institution in the society which stands firm and solid and tempers the youth spiritually and physically. We want the youth to come home upon being released into the reserve, not just mature and strong but also with a well-developed personality.

It is not enough just to want this, however. Times change, after all. The term of military service has been reduced, and the caliber of the recruits frequently leaves something to be desired. Be that as it may, the commanders themselves do not always do enough to complete the upbringing of their subordinates. Some units do not have regulation order. Does this not account for the beatings, the abasement of human dignity, the "dedovshchina"? All of these things contribute to the desertion rate. There are exceptions, to be sure. When a soldier deserts the unit for being forced to mop floors, for example, concocting some nightmare scenario as better justification.

There are many other causes, of course, which I shall not undertake to analyze, since I am not able to see "into" the current condition of the Ukrainian armed forces or the processes occurring therein. We have a heavy load of problems inherited from the recent past. All of these disgraceful things occurred also in the former army, after all, and now the force of inertia is making itself felt.

[Donskoy] Aleksandr Leonidovich, what is the oblast state administration doing to eradicate the disgraceful phenomenon of desertion from the units by military personnel?

[Sidorenko] The Administration of the Representative of the President for Kharkov Oblast constantly receives information on deserters from the oblast military commissariat, cooperates with internal affairs agencies, garrison commanders and military commissariats, and, when necessary, submits recommendations for enforcing the Law of Ukraine on Universal Military Duty and the Military Service.

Now, about the commission which I head. It does not have adequate tools for influencing the situation. We consider our role to be that of achieving mutual understanding among parents, their children, military structures and law-enforcement agencies. It is a known fact that some parents have apprehensions about their sons serving in the military. Some of the blame goes to the press, which sometimes thoughtlessly savors incidents of "dedovshchina" and depicts army life with bias. It is our prime duty to put the parents at ease, to give them the necessary explanations and get them in touch with those authorities involved in the service of the youth.

We do not rely just on the enormous capabilities of such social organizations as the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, Rukh and the SOU [Ukrainian Officers' Union]. We also take advantage of the military units stationed in the oblast. We use them as examples to demonstrate the present state of the Ukrainian military, beginning with the state symbols and ending with the barracks and the organization of everyday military life. We tell the parents that we no longer have and will not again have the former secrecy. Come and take a look at the lives of the soldiers. Your children will have the same circumstances in other oblasts of Ukraine. This is the army of our sovereign, independent state, and our laws and procedures are in effect in it.

[Donskoy] And what role do the local mass media play in this?

[Sidorenko] Our newspapers, radio and television try to provide fair and objective information on all these matters. We go on television and radio and publish articles in the city newspapers along with Maj Gen Yuriy Klynkin, the oblast military commissar. We stepped up these activities particularly during the induction, and the plan was fulfilled in its entirety. A lot of the credit goes to the oblast military commissariat. Yuriy Andreyevich has demonstrated that he is a thinking and competent man who does not hesitate to tackle any job. He went out among the people. Many of his interesting and practical proposals have been implemented.

[Donskoy] The problem of working with the predraft youth is a pressing one today as never before. We hear complaints to the effect that all of the old things have been destroyed and nothing new has been created. The Komsomol induction ceremonies and the honorary names for ships and subunits have all passed into oblivion. A lull has set in in the military-patriotic indoctrination....

[Sidorenko] Any state which wants to exist and develop has to see to the defense of its interests and sovereignty. Every strong state must have a strong military. And without military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth such a state will not be built. My position as chairman of the oblast induction commission, deputy head of the state administration and chief of the education administration is clear. It is that we will not curtail this work or level off in it to any extent whatsoever. On the contrary, we are trying to link it to the realities of today, to Ukrainian statesmanship and the Ukrainian national army. We are making an effort to conduct systematic indoctrinational work with the predraft youth in accordance with a prescribed program and subject matter, using the mass media, specialists in military affairs and psychologists. We can only serve as leaders, though. I feel that the center of the actual predraft preparation and the military-patriotic indoctrination should be in the units stationed in the oblast. And where there are none, in the military commissariats.

This is what it consists of. If there is some military formation of the armed forces stationed in an administrative rayon, we show its everyday functioning and organization to give the youth a concept of their future service. The military collective in the formation must therefore have an irreproachable reputation and great prestige. The unit command element must not only engage in the combat training, but also bear in mind its part in the draft and the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth, be active in holding open-door days and joint athletic activities, strengthen sponsorship ties....

We pin great hopes on the new military structures of the social and psychological service. And although it is still in the formative stage, we have already established ties and relations with its representatives. A state system must be set up in Ukraine for the training and indoctrination of the youth. Many problems can then be solved competently and on a good professional level.

[Donskoy] The recent draft into the armed forces of Ukraine was conducted under the new Law on Universal Military

Duty and the Military Service. And yet, desertions continue to occur. What do you read into the concept of universal military duty?

[Sidorenko] It is fairly precisely defined in the law. As a citizen of my state and one who has served in the military, I can say this. If we want a strong army, military duty must be universal. If a youth has reached draft age and his health permits, he must enter the military ranks and give a year or a year and a half to serving the state. After that he can get an education and arrange his personal life. His home, his country, his homeland now need his protection. And this is not a matter of building up militaristic sentiments. Life demands it. We are creating our economy, our education and health-care systems and, naturally, a system for guaranteeing the security and national interests. A true patriot and citizen of one's country cannot stand on the sideline in this process.

Returning to the subject of the interview, I want to say that as a result of steps taken by the state administration, the internal affairs administration and the oblast military commissariat, many deserters have been apprehended and returned to their stations. We are continuing to work on this.

Ukrainian Servicemen Return Home From Central Asia, Caucasus

93UM0044B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
15 Sep 92 p 1

[Ukrinform report: "They Are Returning to the Homeland"]

[Text] The transfer of servicemen and their families who are citizens of Ukraine to the homeland from the Caucasus Military District and Central Asia continues. Aircraft of the Ukrainian armed forces take off and set out on a course to the southeast almost every day. As of 13 April of this year 6,708 people, including 2,514 families, 736 children, 2,214 officers, 334 warrant officers and 2,064 enlisted men, had been removed from danger areas. Of the 11,559 people scheduled for return to Ukraine, more than half of our compatriots have already been transferred. The command element of the Ukrainian Air Force is making every effort to return Ukrainian citizens to the homeland.

Courage and good professional training are enabling the military pilots to transport the servicemen and their families to our state. Despite the difficult weather conditions and the great physical and mental load, crews led by such officers as Zimin, Derevyanko, Kuznetsov and Chernysh have completed more than just a single flight from the southern nations of the CIS.

Today military transports of the Ukrainian Air Force are flying out of such cities as Tbilisi, Ashgabad, Nakhichevan, Kutaisi, Kopetnari, Tskhakaya, Shiraki and Yerevan.

Officers Demand Speedy Return to Homeland

93UM0045A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Kaushanskiy: "From Kiev: It Is Not so Simple for the Officers To Return to Ukraine. Not Trusting Politicians, They Decided To Speed Up Their Homecoming."]

[Text] Participants of the Third Conference of the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora (Soud) gathered yesterday on Independence Square in Kiev. That is precisely how the organizers officially named it. As the appeal of the authors of this action read, it was to take place not in a hall but on the squares and streets of Kiev and end "not with the adoption of a theoretical resolution, but with the scoring of a practical victory." Just what is the point here?

Back in the summer at the first two Soud conferences in the republic's capital, some of the officers who are now stationed in other countries of the CIS, not trusting politicians, decided to speed up their transfer into the armed forces of Ukraine independently, protect their social rights, and gather together at least 5,000 people on Independence Square on 21 September. The essence of Soud's demands is to create in Ukraine still this year a Main Certification Board which would accept on a competitive basis from each person, including reservists, tests for the right to serve in national armed forces. This competition should be held no later than 1993. The second demand is to return immediately to the republic those service members who pledge their allegiance to the people of Ukraine on the square on 21 September.

Frankly speaking, the action is unprecedented.

Of course, they were unable to gather together 5,000 people on the square, but only several hundred officers, primarily from the Transcaucasus region, Baltic region, and the republics of Central Asia. The official view of the Ministry of Defense regarding the transfer of officers from countries of the CIS to Ukraine is generally known: it must be accomplished on a legal basis within the framework of understandings.

Cadres Chief on Possible Return of Ukrainian Officers

93UM0047A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
22 Sep 92 p 1

[Interview with Col Ivan Grigoryevich Khomyak, first deputy chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, by Maj Gennadiy Klyuchikov, NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent, under the rubric "Response": "Do Not Push People Onto the Square"]

[Text] The Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora has for a long time spoken out for a rapid solution to the problem of returning to the homeland servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine and want to serve in its armed forces. The Soud [Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora] is working toward the establishment of a Main Competitive Certification Commission (GAKK) and the registration of a composite regiment in the Ukrainian armed forces to replace those 10,000 officer who did not take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine and those who have already served out their required term.

Since practically all of these problems have to do with personnel issues, our correspondent has asked Col Ivan Grigoryevich Khomyak, deputy chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, to comment on the situation we face.

[Klyuchikov] I am well familiar with the demands set forth by the Soud. Some of them are premature, and there are

also those which are contrary to the laws of Ukraine and legal enactments on the officers' service. I shall attempt to prove this.

[Khomyak] Col A. Slyusarev, Soud chairman, is trying to convince us that we can cut the armed forces of Ukraine to 200,000-220,000 men by 1994. It would be simply physically impossible to do so, however. There are around 70,000 servicemen in the Ukrainian armed forces who still have more than five years to serve. Many, many officers and warrant officers are approaching the end of the maximum service term but cannot be released without violating the Law on Social and Legal Protection for Servicemen and Their Families because they cannot be provided with apartments.

We are only getting close to having a system of service by contract, and the draft statute on the GAKK calls for the discharge of officers who lose out in the competition. The Law of Ukraine on Universal Military Duty and the Military Service does not allow for discharges for this reason. Reality demands that we seek more flexible solutions. Otherwise, the explosion of social tensions will produce directly opposite results.

It is difficult today to agree also with the demand that we establish testing in the Ukrainian language and the history of Ukraine, which could not be passed in our situation by many servicemen of Ukrainian nationality, not to speak of members of other nationalities. The concept for defense and the building of the armed forces approved by the Supreme Soviet on 11 October 1991 calls for establishing the armed forces of Ukraine and not a Ukrainian national army. Such a step would be contrary to the Law on Citizenship of Ukraine and would result in the immediate release of all those who are not Ukrainian according to Paragraph 5. And they account for around 55 percent of the Ukrainian armed forces.

The Soud's proposals totally rejects the government's decision to reform the armed forces in phases and reduce them on a planned basis.

What is more, an attempt to establish a Ukrainian national army could lead to anti-Ukrainian sentiments both in the other CIS nations and in the rest of the world.

[Klyuchikov] And what would you say about those servicemen who have refused to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine but continue to serve in its armed forces? That is absurd. The Executive Committee of the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora cite a figure of 10,000 officers.

[Khomyak] I agree with you and I can report that the vast majority of officers and warrant officers who did not take the oath have been released into the reserve or transferred to continue their service in the armies of other CIS countries. The figure of 10,000 cited in the statement by the Soud in no ways coincides with the reality. The truth is that there are only individual officers left in this category, but they are not provided with housing. We have no moral right to throw a person onto the street just because he has not taken the oath.

[Klyuchikov] How do you feel about the proposal that we establish a Main Competitive Certification Commission?

[Khomyak] I have to admit that it contains a rational seed. This system is extensively employed in many armies of the

world. Matters pertaining to competitive selection are being worked out fairly vigorously by our specialists in the Military Education Directorate of the Ukraine's Ministry of Defense. The tests are ready, and we have experience in competitive selection.

It is our opinion, however, that it would be premature to introduce this system on the practical level right now. This is why. I have already spoken of one reason: the lack of social protection for servicemen. Let us say that someone fails the test. Who else will accept for military service a citizen of Ukraine who has taken the oath of allegiance to its people?

In addition to this, testing the servicemen without getting them used to working with computers will produce nonobjective results.

The GAKK, which the SOUD insists we establish, would be expected to assume all aspects of professional screening of officers except for the main one, the practical testing of officers in such basic disciplines as tactical training and ability to command subunits.

Consciously or unconsciously, the authors of the GAAK plan are trying to replace the combat training system of the Ukrainian armed forces, which includes organizational and monitoring functions, with their own, which only monitors. The commanders would become nothing but statistics in this situation.

[Klyuchikov] That sounds convincing. If that is so, however, is it not possible to settle all of the controversial issues during the debate and prevent the situation from going to extremes.

[Khomyak] Literally on the eve of the protest by the SOUD, I had a fairly long talk with Col Slyusarev, chairman of the SOUD, in the presence of the president's military adviser, SOU [Ukrainian Officers' Union] activists and department heads of the Personnel Directorate of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

I tried to convince Aleksandr Igoryevich that we have a well-based program for returning to the homeland servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine. We have an order from the president of Ukraine and an order from the minister of defense of Ukraine, which comprise the legal foundation for our work in this area. And there can be no delay. Here are some figures.

A total of 3,868 officers from units stationed in the Caucasus Military District have submitted requests to the Personnel Directorate of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for transfers to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Of that number 2,364 individuals have already been transferred by an order of the deputy commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, 160 were not included in the order because they lacked service records, and 103 officers requested not to return to Ukraine.

If the SOUD does indeed include thousands of names of officers who want to serve in the Ukrainian armed forces, then let them contact us and start to cooperate. And there is no need to apply any kind of pressure on us to establish another duplicate structure, let us call it.

I shall add to that. At a time when state agencies are working for the return of Ukrainian military personnel to the homeland, vigorously and purposefully implementing the program which has been worked out, this social organization lags considerably behind in the resolution of these matters and is practically incapable of rendering any kind of real assistance.

We should not incense the people and push them onto the squares but explain the laws of Ukraine more extensively to them and tell them about the work being performed by the Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.

Russian Media Accounts of Training Facility Transfer Disputed

93UM0042B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
18 Sep 92 p 1

[Statement by Lt Gen A. Lopata, deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, and Rear Adm V. Viktorov, deputy chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Russian Navy, for Military Delegations of Ukraine and Russia on Statements by Certain Mass Media]

[Text] We know that the Sevastopol Naval Institute is being created out of the Sevastopol higher naval schools under Decree No. 490 passed by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 19 August 1992.

In accordance with the protocol of agreement on the organization of officer training signed by the ministries of defense of Ukraine and Russia at Dagomys on 23 June 1992, citizens of Russia and other CIS states who are cadets at the second- through fifth-year levels are continuing to study without charge at this institute until they complete their training. Furthermore, it is in the plans for them to take the oath of allegiance to those states of which they are citizens. The procedure whereby first-year cadets study there will be governed by corresponding agreements.

The establishment of the institute has received lively coverage by the mass media. Unfortunately, there have been some distortions of facts in the process.

On 23 September 1992, for example, the Ostankino television company's evening news program reported that an ultimatum had been issued to cadets at the Sevastopol higher naval schools: "...either take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine or you will be expelled from Ukraine." That same day the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA printed an article of similar content, which also explained the taking of the oath by institute personnel in a nonobjective manner.

These reports in the mass media do not coincide with the reality and are not contributing to the resolution of the problem of training personnel for the Russian VMF [Navy] and the Ukrainian VMS [Naval Forces].

We feel that the mass media should show greater responsibility in their handling of problems affecting the lives of cadets, citizens of Ukraine or Russia, and their families in order not to undermine the faith of the fraternal peoples in the possibility of a constructive resolution of issues pertaining to the preparation of highly skilled specialists, with the defense interests of both states in mind.

Election Highlights Loss of Officer Union Influence

93UM0047A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
18 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov under the rubric "The Organizational Development of the Armed Forces: The Social Aspect": "The Choice Has Been Made—We Hope it Was a Good One"]

[Text] Under the Statute on the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, local committee agents are named by an order of the committee chairman. Election campaigns were conducted in all the state's oblasts for this new state structure, however.

Maj Gen Vilen Arutyunovich Martirosyan, committee chairman, explained the situation this way:

"Many people are saying that we must build a democratic state, but far from everyone is doing this. And who, if not we, should move resolutely in this direction? The agents could be appointed, of course, but the confidence of the people has always been our main criterion for evaluating an individual. You cannot deceive the people, after all, cannot lull them with pretty slogans."

These words hit the nail on the head. This idea was affirmed during the conference to elect agents for the Kiev Garrison committee.

There were five candidates. Differing in personality and demeanor, they were united by a common desire to put their shoulders to the heavy load of other people's problems and worries. They were prepared to put aside voluntarily their own affairs, where everything was familiar and dependable, and to address themselves to the human pain and suffering, to enter the endless battle against callousness and insensitivity. Ahead of them lay not a colonel's stars but sleepless nights and nervous pressure.

Did everyone assembled understand this? Not at all. Some of them did not conceal the fact that they were at the conference merely by chance. Others never did fully grasp why they were electing agents. Otherwise, how does one explain the persistent questions about how many apartments we had allocated for the servicemen and how much we were to be paid.

Foreseeing this, Maj Gen Martirosyan warned at the beginning of the conference against such angry accusations, insults and empty statements for effect. They still occurred, though. There was more than enough malicious heckling, inappropriate applause and tactless statements. What can you do? That is the way we are. It will obviously be difficult for some people to understand us, to feel our problems in their hearts and give their all to solving them.

The willingness of the candidates to take on the most difficult social problems existing in the military evoked only respect for these bold and resolute people. Desire alone was not enough, however. Was every one of them capable of standing up under the pressure, not losing enthusiasm, not becoming inured to human suffering, of accepting it as his own. Did every one of them know how to work painstakingly to move step by step toward a system of social protection for servicemen?

One could only answer this question and make a choice for this or that candidate after getting to know the person well, hearing his program to the end and, ultimately, feeling confidence in him. To which of the five candidates would you entrust your concerns, on which of them could you count at a difficult time? How frequently we are wrong about a colleague, sometimes even after working with him for years. And one had to form one's opinion of the individual from a three-minute address.

On what should one base his decision? On the recommendation of a public organization? The references of comrades? The leaflets spread around? Or should one trust one's intuition?

It would be difficult to say for sure what guided the conference delegates in their decisions. The presentations of the candidates were incoherent, agitated and not thoroughly thought through. The references of co-workers contained more emotion than persuasive facts.

The deeds, and not the words of the candidates, had the crucial role. Many of the officers sitting in the hall were well acquainted with Lt Col Vladimir Fedorovich Bulavintsev, deputy chairman of the Committee for KVIRTU (Kiev Higher Radiotechnical Engineering School of Air Defense) and chairman of the primary organization of the Sozidatel Alliance for the Social Protection of Servicemen, Retirees and Their Families. His part in the creation and the functioning of a committee of servicemen without apartments at the Kiev Garrison, his uncompromising campaign for the social rights of servicemen in his own KVIRTU and his vigorous participation in the committee all identified him as a determined and tireless person with specific experience and a state approach to the resolution of problems involved in providing social protection for his fellow servicemen.

Probably few people were surprised at the voting results, which gave 50 percent of the votes to Lt Col Bulavintsev. Martirosyan was right when he said that the people would be able to see through a person and identify his main qualities. And no kind of assurances or recommendations could mislead them.

The following also occurred. Many of those attending the conference were confident that Col Aleksandr Grigoryevich Pavlenko would win election. He is a member of the central administration of the SOU [Ukrainian Officers' Union], and he established the primary SOU organization in his administration. Col of Militia Grigoriy Yemelyanovich Omelchenko, chairman of the Ukrainian Officers' Union, gave him an extremely worthy recommendation. Despite this, Bulavintsev received three and a half times as many votes as Pavlenko.

Was that just happenstance? Was it a candidate's inability to pursue and sway those present? Shortcomings in the way the conference was conducted? All of these factors unquestionably had an effect. I believe that this is a symptom which is cause for concern to SOU, however. It appeared also in the elections in other oblasts of Ukraine. It seems that some SOU members got carried away with the political campaign and left in the background the task previously defined as the priority, that of providing social protection for the servicemen.

One can disagree with this opinion, but there are grounds for studying SOU's performance.

Is it so important just what public military organization's representative won the election, though? The main thing, Col of Militia G. Omelchenko pointed out, was to elect committee agents with civic courage and capable of defending the rights of every servicemen and of focusing their efforts on the resolution of urgent problems.

I would like to think that Col V. Bulavintsev, the agent of the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families under the Cabinet of Ministers, is just such a person.

Committee on Social Defense of Servicemen Sets up Network in Military Garrisons

93UM0047B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Maj Gennadiy Klyuchikov under the rubric "The Organizational Development of the Armed Forces: The Social Aspect": "The Agents: Opportunity or Illusion?"]

[Text] In accordance with Point 4 of the Statute on the Committee for Social Protection of Servicemen under the Cabinet of Ministers, the committee is to have agents in all 25 oblasts of Ukraine and at the two largest garrisons, at Kiev and Sevastopol. Each oblast will have three committee agents, one responsible for the armed forces and designated from among the senior officers, one responsible for relations with public organizations, parties and movements and appointed from among the reserve officers, and one responsible for the work performed with draftees and first-term servicemen and designated by the soldiers' mothers.

It is planned to expand the network of committee agents in the future to individual units, where they will work on a volunteer basis. This system is already being employed and is producing good results.

It is the main job of committee agents to monitor the observance of all the provisions of the Law on Social and Legal Protection for Servicemen and Their Families and other similar legal enactments. We know that the law itself is interpreted fairly freely in certain areas. At Ivano-Frankovsk, for example, officers who have not taken the oath of loyalty to Ukraine have paid 100 percent of the rent for apartments and the cost of municipal services.

The agents have been given fairly broad authority to enable them to perform their jobs fully. They may demand from officials all the information they require, and issues of secrecy may not be used as justification for refusing. The agents may visit the military units at any time without advance warning and attend meetings. They may have public assistants in the units. Each servicemen has the right to appeal directly to a committee representative, bypassing his direct superior. When anonymity is requested, the desire is respected.

I cannot deny that we are already hearing numerous doubts, sometimes out-and-out complaints, about the new structures. Why inflate the staffs? If one trusts the commander, then why place yet another monitor over him, particularly one with such authority?

Lt Col V. Chechilo, chief of the committee's general department, has responded to these complaints in the following way. In the first place, there is no inflation of the staffs, since there will be only 81 agents for all of Ukraine. Organizations with far more personnel than this deal with these problems in the developed European countries. In the second place, the committee's representatives have been given such broad authority to enable them to raise protection of the serviceman and his interests to the state level. The authority is perfectly adequate to pursue the campaign against lawlessness to its logical end.

Lt Col (reserve) I. Lukovich, agent for the Ternopol Garrison who works on a volunteer basis, makes precisely this kind of use of his authority. He has placed under the control of the public all aspects of the social protection of servicemen and strives to see that scarce goods are distributed fairly, inventories the service housing, sees to it that the allocation of plots for housing construction is fair, and much more. The fact that there are only around 100 servicemen without apartments at this garrison is due in great part to his vigorous efforts.

Incidentally, when I talked with Vitaliy Ivanovich Chechilo, he mentioned the following. The structure for the social protection of servicemen being set up in Ukraine is very similar to that which has operated in the FRG since 1949. And Germany abandoned totalitarianism and established a democratic state and its armed forces, as we are now doing. A structure was set up on the parliamentary level to protect the rights of servicemen. A great deal of experience in this area has now been acquired in Germany. The Bundeswehr does not have any problems with nonregulation relations.

And so, the committee's structure is neither inflated nor artificially conceived. The establishment of the positions of committee agents cannot solve all of the problems in and of itself, however. A great deal depends upon who assumes the positions and what qualities they possess.

Although the statute calls for the appointment of agents by order of the committee chairman, in order to prevent extremely undesirable errors in the selection it was decided to appoint to the positions those who would win election.

This decision has justified itself entirely. There were five nominees in the Lvov elections, for example. It is a noteworthy fact that some candidates did not win simply because their programs were too politicized and overly replete with slogans. People are only turned off by this today.

Even membership in this or that popular party or public organization does not enhance one's chances. The electors value only the candidate's human qualities and his ability to focus on the social protection of servicemen. When there was an outcry in the hall over the fact that Col P. Litvinenko was running when he is not an SOU [Ukrainian Officers' Union] member, he calmly replied that he intended to protect the rights of servicemen and not to engage in a political campaign. And although Litvinenko's rival had a solid recommendation from the SOU, Petr Petrovich received twice the number of votes cast for the other.

"Naturally, we have our own opinion of the candidates," said Maj Gen B. Lavrinenko, deputy committee chairman, "and we know those with whom we have worked more and

can best evaluate their efficiency. If our predictions do not come true, however, and the people elect a different candidate, we do not regard this as a defeat. On the contrary, we are happy to have avoided a possible mistake. After all, who knows better than the servicemen who can best defend their rights?"

Most of the agents elected and approved by the committee chairman have already begun performing their immediate duties. They have succeeded in establishing solid contacts with practically all of the political parties and public organizations. Representatives of the state administration also willingly cooperate with the committee agents.

Odessa Officers Dismissed After Setting up Cossack Group

93UM0045B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by the press service of the Union of Cossacks: "Is Genocide Possible Again? To the Events in the Odessa Military District."]

[Text] The Dunay Cossacks, which had existed for centuries here on the territory of the former Bessarabia, was established on 5 September 1992 in the city of Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy of Odessa Oblast at a small Cossack circle.

On 14 September, the initiators of reviving the Dunay Cossacks—Colonel V. Kucher, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Kornev, Lieutenant Colonel G. Nekrasov, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Lomovtsev, Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Glushchenko, Lieutenant Colonel A. Pronin, and Captain G. Antonov—were summoned to the leadership of the Odessa Military District (Lieutenant-General Radetskiy) and charged with violation of the oath and treason towards Ukraine and discharged from the army for "discrediting the high rank of a Ukrainian officer" with infringement of rights. Thus, seven officers were thrown out of the army and left to the mercy of fate (without severance benefits, without an apartment, and so forth) for the initiative of creating the Dunay Cossacks. And it is only because the leadership of the Odessa Military District regarded the act of reviving the Dunay Cossacks as the creation of pro-Russian Cossack formations.

These events described are not a chance occurrence, but undisguised and flagrant tyranny and a violation of human rights, for there are not and cannot be any illegal actions in what the officers did either with respect to military legislation or with respect to the civil legislation of Ukraine. The initiators of reviving the Dunay Cossacks did not set any military or much less political goals for themselves (the charter and program was not yet completely drawn up). Their aspirations were linked primarily to restoring the lofty moral traditions of Cossacks, customs, and the system of Cossack land use.

Today, the military leadership of Ukraine is trying to unfold an openly unfair trial, getting the military procuracy involved in this incident in order to fabricate a "case" and bring these Kazakh officers to a military tribunal.

Deputy Commander on Railroad Troops

93UM0045C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian 7 Oct 92 p 1

[Interview with Col Viktor Afanasyevich Karpenko, chief of the Socio-Psychological Service and deputy chief of the

Railroad Troops of Ukraine, by Maj Valeriy Korol, NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent; place and date not given: "It Is Special Duty in the Railroad Troops"]

[Text] He was born in 1952 in Chernigov Oblast. After graduating from the Leningrad Higher School of Railroad Troops and Military Transport Communications, he served in Ukraine. As deputy commander of a separate railroad battalion, he took part in the clean-up operations following the Chernobyl disaster.

He has served the last years in Lithuania. He arrived in Ukraine in the first days of 1992. His family is still in Vilnius. In June he was appointed chief of the Socio-Psychological Service and deputy chief of the Railroad Troops of Ukraine. Colonel Viktor Karpenko is interviewed by a NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent.

[Korol] Viktor Afanasyevich, first a few words about the modern Railroad Troops of Ukraine. After all, haven't significant changes taken place in them during the past year?

[Karpenko] Above all, the Railroad Troops are now moving to a new professional level. Before, it must be admitted, our subunits spent 10 months a year at practical work training facilities. One to one and a half months were left for training. Is it possible to train a full-fledged specialist and give him the necessary knowledge and skills in that time? Training had to be completed on the job? Then during this month and a half we had to prepare for the upcoming "purely field" training; so this time flew by in the continuous flow of endless and necessary matters.

Now the railroad troops train in five months. Serious attention is being devoted to combat training. Sessions on special subjects are usually held at training areas which practically every battalion has.

Therefore, the railroad troops are fully prepared when they go to the practical work training facilities, which includes laying and repairing railroad lines and building bridges and other structures.

[Korol] It is apparent that service in the Railroad Troops has its specific nature. Surely, the Socio-Psychological Service also has a specific nature. What does it involve?

[Karpenko] Indeed, duty in the Railroad Troops is special. The troops are perhaps the only ones who make a significant contribution to the economy of our state. The accomplishment of state tasks often depends on how our specialists operate. Therefore, our service is faced with a special task with the arrival of the scheduled induction—to determine the professional suitability of the future specialist. Even the driver or excavating machine operator who comes to us with a certificate sometimes does not meet our requirements. They were given the certificates because the military commissariat sent them for training.

It should be said here that we often determine the future destiny of a young man. You see, after receiving a specialty in the Railroad Troops, he often continues to work in that specialty as a civilian.

[Korol] Viktor Afanasyevich, the Socio-Psychological Service of the Railroad Troops is just spreading its wings. With what did the work begin? In your view, what are the priority directions at this stage?

[Karpenko] Indeed, we have just gotten on our feet. We began with personnel certification. In the final analysis, the effectiveness of our work will depend on the selection and placement of the service's specialists in the units and on their competence.

Now we are practically at full strength. But officers from the CIS countries are consulting us. A permanent certification board is operating for objective examination of the professional suitability of those wishing to serve in Ukraine's Railroad Troops.

I believe the most important priority in the work now is to instill in servicemen pride in belonging to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and love for the homeland. And we cannot get by here without an in-depth and thoughtful study of the history of our people and their traditions and customs.

[Korol] Viktor Afanasyevich, the category of former political officers and subsequently assistant commanders, who were charged with all educational work before, has disappeared. The Socio-Psychological Service is still in the stage of development. Will there be a gap in educational work in this stage?

[Karpenko] Unfortunately, there already is one, in my opinion. Recently, when we began talking about eliminating this category of educators, many officers were forced to decide, first of all, the question of further employment. Others simply left the job and lost heart. For example, I recently visited the battalion where Captain Bazilchuk was the assistant for work with personnel. In three days I had to answer 223 questions. But, you see, the command of the subunit could have given many of the answers.

Legal work in general requires serious changes. Laws and other documents have been adopted, but soldiers are not familiar with them. There are instances when young men come to us who are authorized a deferment. We have to discharge them.

There are also painful points which we must mention. They are military discipline and going absent without leave. Our work is also aimed at eradicating such phenomena from army life.

[Korol] Railroad troops often must leave the places they are living and move to a new practical work training facility. How do the mutual relations with local authorities take shape in such cases, since many questions of life support depend on them?

[Karpenko] It has already become the rule in the troops that upon arriving at a new work location, the commander makes contact with the authorities during the very first days. This bears good fruits not only from the economic standpoint. After talking with these same representatives of the rural or rayon soviets, the soldiers learn the history of the area and particular features. Then they work altogether differently.

Our soldiers help with the harvest fairly often at the request of local authorities. They go out into the fields on their days off so it does not interfere with practical training work. The contacts are mutually beneficial.

It is another matter that the local authorities at today's prices are unable, say, to help the soldiers with something to smoke. They do not have enough at the normal price. And

the market prices take even a bigger bite. This is even provided that our soldier can earn decent wages, say, 1000 coupons and a monetary award for accomplishing a task.

Lately, and it is gratifying to note this, more attention has been given to us on the part of authorities and public organizations. I do not think this is by chance. The people have recognized their army and care about it like their own.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Rayon Military Official On Progress Of Draft

93US0061F Baku AZERBAIJAN MUELLIMI in Azeri
11 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with Colonel E. Guliyev, Binegedi Rayon Military Commissar: "The Defense Of Our Fatherland Is In Good Hands"]

[Text] For five years our malefic neighbors have taken peace away from us. The undeclared war has caused tragedies, deprivation and wounds that will not heal. In the mountainous part of Karabakh, in our border regions, our lands are aflame and raked with gunfire. Innocent blood is flowing. Our mothers and sisters, daughters and brides, are hostages. Thousands of families have been exiled from their native lands, their warm nests, and are leading a difficult life.

Under these conditions, everyone from child to adult, is going to defend the fatherland, and has declared himself ready to destroy the enemy. And what is the situation in the military commissariat? Is the work conducted with draft-age youth satisfactory? Is the level of ideological-political and military patriotic education among the draftees adequate?

With the goal of receiving an answer to these questions, our colleague met with the military commissar of Binegedi Rayon, Colonel E. Guliyev, and interviewed him.

[Interviewer] Colonel, I would like you to give me some information about the situation of work conducted with youth prior to the draft.

[Guliyev] We are trying to structure all our work on the course of the war in our republic around the laws on wartime conditions. Every day dozens of draft-age youth, as well as many citizens in the reserve, receive a draft document from the military commissariat, and try to fulfill their patriotic duty, defend our land, and promise to alleviate the misfortune of our peaceful population, the old, and the children and come to their aid. It is a joyful situation that the majority of the youth understand the existing situation well and have drawn the correct conclusions; they cannot stand the atrocities committed by our ill-intentioned neighbors and come to the military commissariat as soon as they receive their first draft documents. Among them there are even those who have not yet reached draft age and girls.

Recently a teenager named Eldar came to me. I received him and learned the reason for his coming. In his conversation Eldar began to complain about workers at the commissariat. He complained that they would not let him enlist and go to the front, and explained that I was his last hope.

I talked to Eldar a long time. I learned the name of his school and where his parents worked. I appreciated the fact that he had come on a bad day for the fatherland and I embraced

him. No matter how difficult it was, I found a common language with him. I recommended he wait until he was drafted and he concurred.

Unfortunately, I was unable to change Ilgar's mind. What a pity! I mean Ilgar Memmedov. You probably never met him. There was something about him in the press. He graduated from secondary school with a gold medal and was accepted at the N. Nerimanov Medical University. He was a student in the first year. He came often to the military commissariat and to me personally, and wanted to be mobilized and sent to the front. Our words, our advice, even the law then in effect did not influence him. Finally, during the summer break, he set out for the front voluntarily without informing us and died bravely for the soil of his native Karabakh.

Although such bitter losses sadden us, they give us a firm guarantee that the defense of our Fatherland is in good hands, and also play a major irreplaceable role in the organization of our work and in the ideational-political and patriotic training which we conduct among the conscripts.

[Interviewer] Is there not another side to this kind of happy incidents?

[Guliyev] Unfortunately, yes. For more than two months we have been unable to find seven draft-age youths. They are not even going home at night. Some are hiding in the gardens, some are speculating somewhere, and some simply refuse to do their patriotic duty and choose to "disappear." Such ill-intentioned children of the Fatherland will undoubtedly be found sooner or later and we will succeed in severely punishing them. This is not the issue. What disturbs us is why such a group which lives on the same land and under the same sky lacks enthusiasm for the Fatherland, turns away from it, and leads a parasitic life.

[Interviewer] Has it ever occurred to you that the school and the teachers working in it are guilty in forming this unhealthy mentality among such as those?

[Guliyev] As hard as it is to take, we have to recognize the truth.

[Interviewer] The new school year has just begun: what would you say to the teachers engaged in educating the youth of today and tomorrow, what do you want from them?

[Guliyev] I thank our teachers and education workers who have taken on such a very difficult, yet honorable work commitment as educating and forming our children and, in the name of the flourishing and progress of our sovereign republic, wish them new successes. I am sure that our teachers, along with imparting deep knowledge to their students, will also be engaged seriously with their training, especially their military-patriotic training, that they will strive mightily to raise the youths with great hearts and a fiery spirit for the Fatherland, for the people, and for our native land, and will do so unstintingly. The present war-time situation and our future life of abundance demand this.

[Interviewer] Thank you for the interview.

Analysis of Military Aspects of Abkhazian Situation

93UM0050A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Anatoliy Stasovskiy, under the rubric: "Military Review": "Next—a 'Southern Front'? The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict Could Become Prolonged in Nature"]

[Text] Many articles have been published recently in the press on the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, including in KRSNAYA ZVEZDA. They primarily provide the political aspect of the situation that has developed. In this survey, we attempt to analyze primarily the military aspect of the conflict.

While analyzing the events that have occurred after 3 September when the Moscow Agreement on Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict in Abkhazia was concluded, it became obvious that the short truce, if it existed at all, was used by the conflicting parties only to prepare for even more decisive operations.

The primary centers of confrontation during September have not been eliminated—these are the so-called Bzyb Axis toward Gagra and the Gumista Axis toward Sukhumi. What is more, the Abkhazian Side has not begun to stretch out the assembled reinforcements along the entire front but has concentrated its forces in the Gagra Sector where the enemy is most vulnerable. For example, on 13-14 September, approximately 6,000-7,000 Abkhazian popular untrained volunteer military troops and their "confederates" were concentrated in the village of Bzyb. From time to time, these armed detachments did not manifest any particular aggressiveness. Nevertheless, on 14 September after receiving reports from his intelligence, Gagra Commandant Badri Pirtskheliani sounded the alarm.

And actually—the Gossoviet troops airborne assault force (initially with a strength of 1,000 men) that was landed in the area of Gagra was gradually increased to 8,000.

The Abkhazians have operated much more aggressively there. Already on 14 September local volunteers were formed up into three regiments (in truth, one was in reserve due to a lack of weapons) which according to strength and structure were similar to the composition of Russian motorized rifle units, naturally without taking into account vehicles. A new commander was also designated for the Abkhazian untrained volunteer military forces. Thirty three-year-old former USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops Major Vladimir Arshba, who immediately received the rank of colonel, became the new commander.

Arshba rapidly posted his two regiments on the axes of the proposed attacks—toward Gagra and Leselidze. Two detachments from the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus (approximately 200 soldiers each) approached here.

Understandably, the buildup of such substantial forces could not pass unnoticed. On 2 October at 09:00, Georgian SU-25 ground attack aircraft (they, as we all know, are manufactured at an aircraft plant in Tbilisi) bombed the outskirts of Gagra, obviously, in order to disrupt the attack of the armed formations of Abkhazia and the Confederation

of the Peoples of the Caucasus (KNK). It is difficult to judge if they managed to inflict damage to Abkhazian or "confederate" personnel or equipment through this bombing but there were serious losses among the peaceful residents.

And what happened next is what should have occurred in war. Gossoviet troops and "Mkhedrioni" detachments had already been ousted from Gagra by lunch time on 2 October. Indeed, they managed to dig in at the Gantiadi—Leselidze Line which is near the Russian border. Immediately afterward, small detachments of Georgian troops (a total of approximately 500 people) began to be brought in by air in the area of Gantiadi. But the principle of "into an engagement on the move" works only with good preparation beforehand. Naturally, attempts to retake Gagra on the morning of 5 October did not amount to much. And already a day later, the disorganized Georgian soldiers finally began to retreat toward the Russian border. So the Abkhazian subunits and their "confederates" comparatively easily occupied Gantiadi and Leselidze.

The Abkhazians' access to the Russian border gives them the capability to totally control an important coastal road in the strategic sense and the only railroad on the coast.

Official Tbilisi, having borne perceptible losses at the front, immediately began to extricate itself from the difficult situation. But in the search for causes of its defeat, state and military figures have attempted to detect the guilty person elsewhere and Russia has been mentioned most often. In the process, very little attention is being paid to the statements of the commanders of their own army that serious problems with discipline exist in their subunits, Georgian soldiers do not know their vehicles very well and they do not know how to competently service them, already not talking about the "Mkhedrioni" formations. There is practically no command and control system at the front.

Of course, Georgia is not reconciling itself to the losses of the initiative and of important regions. A concentration of Georgian vehicles (primarily from the composition of the former Soviet Army 10th Division at Alakhtsakhi that was transferred to Georgia in accordance with the Tashkent Agreements) is already being observed for the second week in the area of Ochamchira and the village of Eshera where the Abkhazian defense line runs. During the past week, 25 tanks were moved by ship from Poti to Sukhumi. But there aren't enough personnel. Although the call up of 40,000 reservists had been announced already on 3 October, no more than 500 men had ended up at the front last week according to certain information.

Indeed, that was on the eve of the parliamentary elections. And here the Gossoviet sooner needed political than military battalions.

So the primary events will only unfold right now. The "Tbiliseli" Division is being formed from volunteers. Obviously, the mandatory selection of people into the army will also be actively conducted.

The probable axis of the Georgian offensive will be north of the Gumista River. But, the "northern front" has been eliminated and the Abkhazians have already fortified that area with forces of up to two battalions. Information has been received that the Abkhazian Goskomitet [State Committee] Defense Headquarters (untrained volunteer military

force) is preparing plans in the event of the initiation of combat operations on this axis. Vladimir Arshba became Abkhazian Minister of Defense on Monday and received much broader powers. This is once more confirmation of the fact that the Abkhazians hope to hold the "southern front".

Military experts think that the best method to retake the coastal populated areas that have been occupied by the "Abkhazian separatists" is simultaneous strikes from the sea and land. But the Georgian Army does not have the special equipment to conduct amphibious assault landings. You can successfully use civilian ships for an assault landing only under the condition of surprise. That won't happen right now. The Georgian Army is also currently incapable of organizing tactical air assault landings.

Of course, having weighty superiority in military equipment and weaponry, the Georgian Army can count on victory but only after a month or two of engagements. Although with such an outcome, the war will not end but will be prolonged and partisan in nature because the untrained volunteer militia and the "confederates" will go up into the mountains.

So, the most correct variation for Shevardnadze and Ardzinba is to return to the negotiating table. Before it's too late...

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Dushanbe Situation Report

93UM0111A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Oct 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Anatoliy Ladin and Anatoliy Ivlev: "The Situation in Dushanbe Is Virtually out of Control: Russian Servicemen Fear Being Drawn into Political Games"]

[Text] The fierce exchanges of gunfire which began in the capital of Tajikistan on 25 October have sharply exacerbated the already difficult situation in the republic. It has become clear that the authorities are unable to take control of the situation without outside assistance.

The republic is already being given such assistance—true, only humanitarian assistance. As Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Tkachev, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for Emergency Situations, told a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Tajikistan continues to receive humanitarian assistance from Russia. A bilateral working group has been created which is involved in the distribution of food, medicine, gasoline, coal, fuel oil, and kerosene coming into the republic.

The humanitarian assistance will save thousands of people from starvation. However, it does not protect them from the wave of terror continuing in the republic.

Residents of Kulyab Oblast no longer risk leaving their place of residence. Outside the oblast a person can get shot just because his passport has a stamp of registration in Kulyab Oblast.

As Lieutenant Colonel Grigoriy Loktiokov, commander of the motorized rifle regiment stationed in Kulyab, reported, the situation at the oblast center itself and in the rayons gets worse with each passing day. The cotton has been harvested,

but it is impossible to transport the harvested crop to the storage sites. All enterprises in Kulyab are practically idle due to the lack of energy resources. Only the bakery is operating, which recently has been supplying the population with corn bread.

Incidentally, Russian servicemen are also experiencing great difficulties in connection with the overall situation. On 29 October, Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev, the authorized agent of the Russian Federation for the stay of Russian troops in Tajikistan, met with officers of the headquarters of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division and units stationed in the republic's capital. In connection with the possible decision on dual subordination of the division (to Russia and Tajikistan), officers expressed concern with the fact that they might be drawn into the military adventures of various political forces.

In analyzing the recent events, it can be said that more and more politicians and leaders of local groupings are beginning to understand the futility of further armed struggle. It has become known that it has been decided to create a supranational medzhlis next week—a meeting of representatives of all nationalities living in Tajikistan. Members of national cultural societies and political parties, and also all deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan will take part in the meeting.

The topic, naturally, will be the quest for peace, which everyone is waiting for in Tajikistan. However, so far these expectations have no serious basis. The situation in Dushanbe remains quite tense. After two days of fighting, the crime situation has worsened. Dushanbe is not controlled by various militarized groupings. Disorder has prevailed for six days in the capital of Tajikistan.

Dushanbe is under the threat of being left without drinking water: an unknown armed grouping has stolen the only vehicle for hauling chlorine. If the vehicle is not returned in the near future, it will not be possible to chlorinate the drinking water. Due to a shortage of fuel, bread is not being delivered from the bakeries. Emergency service vehicles and ambulances are practically not going out on calls. Seventeen vehicles have been stolen by armed groupings from the city emergency clinic.

The latest report is that documented evidence has been received on the involvement of mercenaries in armed clashes in Tajikistan. Four Afghan vets, three people from the Baltic region (one of them a resident of Liepaya), two from Saint Petersburg, and one resident of Kaluga Oblast have been killed in fighting in the last two weeks.

ARMS TRADE

Growth of Firearms Smuggling from Russia to Japan

93UM0133A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by Vasilii Golovin, dateline Tokyo: "Common Exchange Items: Japanese Mafia Receiving Nagants and PPSHs"]

[Text] The Soviet PPSH submachineguns with their drum magazines and the legendary commissar Nagants of Civil War times that are so well known from military films have recently become a headache to Japanese police, who have discovered to their horror that the local underworld is successful at making inroads into the black market of Russia, where there is an enormous number of weapons circulating at rock-bottom prices. The most recent cause of alarm for Tokyo was the 10 October arrest, in the city of Sapporo located on the northern island of Hokkaido, of a rank-and-file member of a Japanese criminal element apprehended as he attempted to resell to his colleagues a well-lubricated 1941 Shpagin submachinegun along with a complement of nine rounds of ammunition.

A search of the criminal uncovered a Soviet-made air rifle with more than 700 lead pellets. Police told me that this kind of "sporting item" is capable of killing a man instantly, something which naturally is not welcome in Japan, a place where firearms sales are subject to rigid controls. The criminal world in this country is still armed largely with highly sharpened blades; each shot fired here becomes a sensation of national proportions.

The police assume that the PPSH submachinegun was made available to the criminal from Sapporo in a tried-and-true manner: in exchange for a passenger car, since the suspect is the owner of a used car dealership in the port city of Wakkanai frequently visited by Russian seamen. It was last year that Japanese police acted in the port of Otaru on the island of Hokkaido to detain a dealer, who had traded beat-up cars for two Nagants, which most likely had been in the possession of some geologists or which had possibly decorated one of the numerous museums of combat glory in the former Soviet Union. Confiscated in Japan soon afterward were seven revolvers and a PPSH that had also been brought in via Russian ships. Incidentally, this great interest in the Shpagin weapon is driven not by a penchant for old items, but rather by the fact that it takes cartridges from the good old TT, which for quite some time has been brought into Japan secretly from China, where it is being manufactured under a license granted by the USSR.

It is assumed that the smuggling of weapons from Russia is still of an amateurish and "trial" nature. However, it is feared here that it may not be long before Japan will be inundated with Makarovs and Kalashnikovs that are freely circulating in the former USSR, in the event the mafia is able to devise stable transfer and sales routines. In this connection, it is expected that the prices will be at rock bottom, since the PPSH that won such wide acclaim during the Second World War sells here for approximately 50,000 yen, while a quite inferior American-made pistol usually brings at least 800,000 yen (more than \$2,000) on the local black market.

Japanese police and the customs service, in their attempts to plan for the interdiction of extensive "mutual cooperation" between criminals of the two countries, have initiated setting up ties to their Russian colleagues. There was even a joint conference held in the end of last year in Vladivostok, where, according to information available, the sides made arrangements to exchange information on smugglers' activity on a regular basis. At the same time, Japanese authorities decided to establish continuous general monitoring and surveillance of seamen from the neighboring country, who are coming under increasing suspicion as potential carriers of the mafia. This is admittedly not an easy task, since Russian ships dropped anchor in Japanese ports more than 3,000 times last year, with the frequency of visits on the rise. Incidentally, information in my possession indicates that the Far Eastern security and customs services do not anticipate any serious attempts on the part of the domestic mafia to supply the Japanese market with weapons. Russian sailors still think of PPSHs and Nagants as common exchange items, in the same category as the traditional caviar and Baltic amber.

Black Market Arms in Ingushetian City of Nazran

93UM0086A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Oct 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Vitaliy Strugovets: "'Kalashnikov Rows' in Nazran"]

[Text] Around 15,000 units of weaponry have accumulated in the hands of the population of the Northern Caucasus. As long as it is being sold freely, as long as the law remains silent, interethnic and intertribal conflicts will continue.

My trip money was but a hundred rubles short for an F-1 grenade, even though they were asking relatively little for it in today's prices—a thousand two hundred. But then, a packet of cartridges for a 5.45-mm caliber assault rifle was clearly not worth 400 rubles in my estimation. But what can you do? It's the market.

Three thousand for an antitank grenade, 150,000 for a pistol, 120,000 for an assault rifle (of course the vendor—an elderly Ingushetian—promised to knock off 10,000 if I would really take it). In general, everything was like in a typical Eastern bazaar. It's just that the goods were not something we were used to seeing—weapons. Carbines, hand grenades, various ammunition, homemade pistols, binoculars, sights and many, many other articles were for sale here. And all of this was completely out in the open. This "Kalashnikov row," as local wits of the arms market have already christened it, is on the outskirts of one of Ingushetia's rayon centers—the city of Nazran.

What is astounding here is not so much the fact itself of open arms trade (such things could be expected these days), as its quantity. The luggage compartment of just one vehicle—there were a good dozen here, and all with different license plates (Kabardinian, Chechen, North Ossetian, and even from Rostov)—contained 27 assault rifles. If there were fewer in the other vehicles, it wasn't by much. Add to this the one or two assault rifles being offered for sale by around five or seven "dismounted" dealers. Overall, according to the most conservative estimates the weapons present in the market at this moment could have outfitted

150-200 persons. Two companies! And the market remains open all day here. Moreover the goods weren't gathering any dust. As I was standing there, in literally just a few minutes I witnessed the purchase of a pistol and an assault rifle. And cartridges were going like hotcakes.

But what's so amazing about any of this? Many in the Northern Caucasus are aware of the existence of Kalashnikov rows in Nazran. Russian People's Deputy Ibragim Kostoyev, who is currently the deputy representative of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet in Ingushetia, was brief in his comments regarding this: "It's a national tradition in Ingushetia—men must carry arms." Mikhail Belousov, the security advisor to the representative from the Russian parliament, was no less "diplomatic": "We are aware of the unrestricted arms trading. But local law enforcement organs are unable to resolve this problem on their own. We do not have the right to issue mandatory orders to a sovereign state such as Ingushetia."

Sovereignty is of course sovereignty, but there is, after all, that free trade edict signed by the president of the Russian Federation, which clearly states that such permission does not extend to weapons and narcotics. Why is this requirement not being observed here in Ingushetia—granted, it's a separate republic, but it's still part of Russia—or in other places? It is an axiom, after all, that as long as people have arms, interethnic conflicts and unchecked criminal activity will continue.

Nonetheless, unrestricted arms trading is a reality. I attempted to find out where the assault rifles and ammunition at the Nazran market come from. Specialists know of three basic channels. From nearby regions of armed conflicts. As a result of their capture from police. And the third channel originates, in the words of North Osetian Minister of Internal Affairs Major General Georgiy Kantemirov, in army depots. This has to be realized as well (though of course it's something we wouldn't want to believe).

And now the facts. In the last three weeks over 50 assault rifles, 53 pistols, 67 grenades and more than 5,000 units of various ammunition were confiscated at Russia's Georgian border and at the administrative boundaries of North Osetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia and Chechen. This was the result of surveillance of rail transportation crossing the border into the close frontier, carried on by joint teams of police and Russian internal troops. But in the opinion of staff officers of the Internal Troops of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Internal Affairs this is not more than 15-20 percent of the weapons flowing through the Northern Caucasus. The principal routes of these "caravans of death" are from Chechen and Abkhazia.

Now about the seizures. In September, armed criminal bands made several attacks upon police organs. As a result of just one of them, which occurred by the way right here in Ingushetia, the arsenal of the criminals was augmented by 10 assault rifles, 13 pistols and hundreds of cartridges.

According to information from the North Osetian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Vladikavkaz garrison is willingly or unwillingly a "supplier" of weapons in the region. Let me report just the most significant facts. A shortage of several hundred pistols was discovered at the end of summer by an inspection of army depots on the city's outskirts.

Seven hundred twenty assault rifles were to be delivered to these same depots on 29 September. Two vehicles and three (!) persons were allocated to transport and protect the cargo. As would have been expected, the arms-laden vehicles were seized. It was only owing to the efficient actions of the police that the vehicles were found four hours later. But the boxes were already over 50 assault rifles lighter.

Now the next question. In whose hands do these weapons wind up? In the opinion of that same Major General Georgiy Kantemirov, in the region the weapons are now "usually playing the role not of the means of political pressure upon the authorities, but of ordinary goods to be traded."

But let's not forget that rule of theater which says that if in the first act of a play you see a rifle mounted on the wall, by the third act it will definitely be fired.

A dispute between two youngsters in Nazranskiy Rayon—Aushev and Khalukhayev—led to a "military" confrontation between the two family clans. By the third day of the conflict each counted 150-200 assault rifles in its ranks. The fight even escalated to the point of grenade launchers: three shots, and the roof of one of the homes was blown off. It was only owing to the efforts of the elders that a massive bloody war was stopped.

Before, even in the Caucasus things never went this far. But now, it seems that the times are different. And if only this was all limited just to Caucasian settlements! Two assault rifles, 90 cartridges, 37 grenades and 40 fuzes for them were confiscated from a 45-year-old inhabitant of Armavir detained at the city's railroad station.

According to operational data there are now around 15,000 units of weapons in private hands in the Northern Caucasus. That is, 15,000 units sowing death.

It is completely obvious that no political peace-making efforts will produce the desired results until these weapons are confiscated, and until laws prohibiting them go into effect. Any state, after all, is built primarily upon effective legislation and proper law and order.

The local authorities insisted that I leave Nazran before dark. Otherwise they couldn't guarantee my safety, they said. During the 10 minutes that I was riding through the city I heard three assault rifle bursts in different places. "They're testing the weapons,"—that's the explanation I got. They were firing into the air—for now.

Indian-Ukrainian Long-Term Cooperation Agreement

93UM0081A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Oct 92 p 3

[Unattributed report in the "Foreign Military Developments Panorama" column: "India to Pay Ukraine for Spare Parts in Currency and Tea"]

[Text] The Ukrainian government and India have concluded a long-term agreement on provision of military equipment and services.

Details of the deal were discussed by Indian Minister of Defense Sharad Pawar during his official visit in Kiev. The arrangement involves deliveries of spare parts for military

equipment purchased from the Soviet Union, including helicopters and military transport aircraft, training of military cadre, and mutual visits by ships. It is expected that payment for the deliveries will be made both in hard currency and by barter.

Tula Advertisement: 2S19 152-MM SP Howitzer
93UM0096A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in English
22 Oct 92 p 4

[Text]

THE 2C19 152 mm SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER

- Powerful armament;
- armour protection;
- high mobility;
- high firing rate with the on-board and from the ground ammunition;
- firing from indirect positions and by direct laying including mountain conditions and contaminated environment;
- built-in bulldozer equipment for digging a trench for SAU;
- overcoming broad water obstacles under water;
- solving all kinds of artillery tasks

SPECIFICATION

Mass	42 tonne
Armament	1x152 mm howitzer 1x2.7 mm MG
Turret traverse	360°, electric
Gun elevation depression	+68°-3°, electric
Maximum firing rate	8 rds/min.
Maximum firing range	24700 m (HE round)

Tula Advertisement: Single-Barreled Shotgun MZ 20-01

93UM0096B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in English
23 Oct 92 p 4

[Text]

Shotgun for Farmers and Not Only

Tula Arms Factory offers the single-barrel magazine shotgun MZ 20-01 for three-five cartridges to farmers, hunters and collectors.

The guns of Tula armourers has been famous since the times of reign of Fyodor Ioanovich the son of Russian czar Ivan the Terrible. Among them—the shotgun MZ 20-01.

Basic Specifications:

Gauge	20
Length, mm	
barrel	635
chamber	70
Barrel muzzle choke, mm	Modified choke
Trigger pull, H (kga)	15...25

(1.5...2.5)

Overall dimensions, mm 1150x67x188

Mass, kg, not over 2.85

If you wish to shoot down the wild-boar or some other bag buy the shotgun MZ 20-01. It will be your staunch friend.

300002 Tula, "Tula Arms Factory"

Tel. 29-17-55, 20-52-64

Telex: 253112 UPA

Fax: (087) 273439

Tula Advertisement: 40-MM Detachable Grenade Launcher for AKM

93UM0096C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in English
24 Oct 92 p 7

[Text] If you want to hit target from the trenches use: THE SUBMACHINE GUN - GRENADE LAUNCHER SYSTEM. This system consists of Kalashnikov submachine gun (AKM or AKMC, or AK-74) and underbarrel grenade launcher (40 mm).

Technical data of 40 mm underbarrel grenade launcher-25

Caliber, mm	40
Number of rifling grooves	12
Weight of grenade launcher without butt plate, kg	1.5
Length of grenade launcher, mm	323
Sighting range, m	400
Practicable rate of fire, r.p.m.	4-5
Carrying rounds, quant./round	10
Type of grenade	fragmentation
Grenade muzzle velocity, m.p.a.	78
Weight of round, kg	0,255
Weight of BB fragmentation charge, kg	0,048
Packing:	
Case for 20 complete sets	
Overall dimensions, mm	1260x517x375
Volume, m ³	0,245
Weight of case, kg	30
Weight of packing, kg	80

Almost simultaneous hitting of enemy with the fire of submachine gun and grenade—especially valuable in battle for frontier—guards, sailors and so on. Use of grenade launcher round give the opportunity to hit the aim with the high angle fire behind barrier, in hollows, buildings and constructions.

300002 Tula, "Tula Arms Factory"

Tel. 29-17-55, 20-52-64

Telex: 253112 UPA

Fax: (087) 273439

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Korolev of Almaz Shipbuilding on Progress of Conversion

93UM0036A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Oct 92 p 2

[Interview with "Almaz" PO [Production Association] General Director Anatoliy Petrovich Korolev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 1st Rank Sergey Bystrov, under the rubric: "The Defense Industry: People and Problems": "If It Is Good for The Enterprise, Then Who Suffers?"]

[Text] "Almaz" Shipbuilding Firm, created in 1901 by the Industrialist Zolotov as a small craft building enterprise, to this day builds small ships and vessels. And despite the upheaval of the country's economy, the convulsions of conversion, and the disruption of customary contacts, deliveries, and orders, "Almaz" hasn't known any misfortune.

What is the secret of its well-being, and how stable is it? "Almaz" PO [Production Association] General Director Anatoliy Korolev answered these and other questions posed by our Correspondent Captain 1st Rank Sergey Bystrov.

[Bystrov] Anatoliy Petrovich, construction of military ships certainly brought glory to your plant. But we know that not one military vessel has been laid at Russian wharves this year. Does anything still tie you to the Navy?

[Korolev] Unfortunately, only the inertia of previous orders. We would certainly continue to build military vessels and ships, many of which have been recognized as the best in the world, but our Navy is no longer capable of buying them. Right now we are turning the latest and, unfortunately, the last assault hovercraft over to the Navy. There is no equal to it on the planet and I think no one else even has the blueprints for a similar craft. The Navy ordered a large number of these series-production craft. But it doesn't have the money. We are turning this one over at our own initiative. It would have been a pity to destroy this vessel while it was still unfinished.

[Bystrov] Right now you can already definitely say: those enterprises that most rapidly took a serious attitude toward conversion are feeling more prosperous. Doesn't that cause "Almaz's" current confident mood?

[Korolev] For us, the economic situation in the country became the impetus for a rapid transition to conversion. Our economists understood that the leapfrog with state orders and with military acceptance would not bring us any good. And we came to the conclusion that we need to rely only on ourselves. That conviction spurred the engineers to become rapidly involved with retooling.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Mr. Atwood visited our plant with some experts. And do you know what conclusion the Americans arrived at? It would be cheaper for them to give \$10 million to Russian plants so that we can retool and no longer produce these ships than to overtake us in the production of military ships.

Therefore, we sought worthy retooling. "Agat" KB [Design Bureau] under "Sudostroyeniye" NPO [Scientific Production Association] quite rapidly developed very promising small civilian passenger ship designs.

[Bystrov] However, didn't rapid entry into conversion signify a total rejection of military construction for you? I cite as an example of that the coastal defense ship.

[Korolev] We placed a task before us that was outside the framework of the interests of any single department or even the country. The program consisted of the development of a small multi-purpose, high-class, combat vessel that could satisfy the needs of the border troops, coastal defense, maritime police, ecological monitoring, etc. The first, the head ship, has been manufactured. On 31 July, it left the plant's walls and our border troops accepted it. Incidentally, U.S. Coast Guard Commander Admiral T. J. William Kite visited it and he stated that he did not expect to see a ship of such high class for coastal defense.

We could easily reequip the ship into a special vessel. It would be sufficient to remove the abundant weaponry from it and to install an ecological monitoring system which is also being developed by the converted "Granat" TsNII [Central Scientific Research Institute].

We have founded two design bureaus which are working on the future. Using the experience of military construction, we have designed a ship with a small waterplane area. This is sort of like two small submarines connected by a large superstructure-bridge. It is a catamaran but not quite. Its seaworthiness is six balls with a 30-meter length and a draught of 2.8 meters. But it is this ship that is capable of sailing through even rough water of the Bay of Biscay. "Sudostroyeniye" NPO is completing a catamaran design for Europe's shallow rivers.

On the whole, "Almaz's" conversion program has turned out to be totally accepted and has become an integral part in the revival program for the Russian Navy which the government must approve. We must develop an entire series of new passenger ships. The most interesting of them, besides those named—are a sidewall ferry (that is, a hovercraft, but they are designing stiff structures that are lowered into the water from the sides) and a wing-in-ground effect vehicle [ekranoplan]. The largest covered slip in Europe is being erected under it.

[Bystrov] If an enterprise is built and expanded today—that already says a lot about it. But, as far as I know, you will have to invest a lot of money into additional construction only because someone stood to gain by dividing "Almaz" Production Association and rapidly, on the eve of the formation of a stock company. What is the matter here?

[Korolev] It is hard to imagine but it turns out that today some sort of incomprehensible commercial structure can reduce, if not a flourishing, then a quite healthy state enterprise to its knees. Igor Sergeyevich Golub worked at our plant until 1990. He currently represents a certain commercial structure that really wanted to seize for itself the entire portion of "Almaz" that is located on Vasilyevskiy Island. And that is a quite powerful and modern plant.

[Bystrov] But how can that be? Even if he was a billionaire, right now in Russia someone wouldn't just simply sell you half of an enterprise?

[Korolev] Igor Sergeyevich states that he is acting on behalf of the workers' collective of the divided enterprise. But even if he promised the people golden mountains, the workers would not support him. Supreme Soviet Deputy P. Filippov, Goskomimushchestvo [State Property Committee] Deputy

Chairman P. Mostovoy, St. Petersburg Soviet Commission for Conversion of the Military-Industrial Complex Chairman Gapanovich and a number of other influential individuals are helping Golub. Minister of Industry A. Titkin also supported that idea for a certain period of time. But later he became convinced that they were simply deceiving him and he said as much at a meeting with the plant collective.

[Bystrov] And you really can't do anything?

[Korolev] We have won two law suits but we don't feel very confident of ourselves. On the contrary, pressure is mounting. They are even making me to understand that if I oppose it, they will not extend the work contract with me personally. It's just like it was before with the CPSU obkom: "If you don't do it as we say, we'll remove you from your job!"

[Bystrov] But maybe that division will still be beneficial?

[Korolev] For whom? For no one other than this commercial structure. And the other consequences? A clearly unjust social distribution of the most active portion of the production resources will occur. With the least number of people at the divided production facility, not only new, but also unique equipment, a new wharf and new berthing facilities have been concentrated there. The main thing is that the two divided enterprises will not produce that combined product that "Almaz" produces today, and a single technological production line will be broken.

[Bystrov] And is "Almaz" taking preventive steps right now, not waiting for lightning to strike?

[Korolev] Yes, we have been compelled to. For six months, we have been aggressively involved in order to ensure the collection of capabilities for the future period. We are hiring and training cadres, primarily, former military personnel. We are building housing.

[Bystrov] But are people not leaving your plant?

[Korolev] Only individual cases. On the contrary. Unemployment does not threaten us. The workers are receiving good salaries. Skilled workers receive nearly 15,000 rubles. The average salary at the plant is R10,000. Unique specialists receive more than R20,000. Well, look at the rolls. Hull Assembler A. Nazhmanov earned more than R23,000 last month. But he is a first class craftsman and a professor of his trade. They will never pay me, the general director, that much. And furthermore, the general director's workday is no less than 12 hours... But we are a state enterprise. And it is sad that the state continually places us in a difficult position. The unguided price formation process which should automatically accompany indexing worries us very much. We are carrying out the state order.

[Bystrov] And yet you are quite optimistic?

[Korolev] You know, they assigned me general director here in February 1986 from the position of deputy general director of the Admiralteyskiy Plant. "Almaz" was in a difficult position. We restored the plant's economic potential in a year and then began to develop new ships. There was a triumph in 1987—we turned over the head ship of a new generation of assault and missile ships. Of course, it was easier to raise the plant when everything was normal in the country than to keep the plant afloat when the economy as a whole is suffering. But without optimism and without an

attempt to maintain and consolidate our business, we will not be of benefit to a reviving Russia.

[Bystrov] Anatoliy Petrovich, literally several words about yourself.

[Korolev] I was born in 1943. After graduation from trade school in Kerch, they assigned me to the construction of whaling tenders at Nikolayev. I soon understood that I needed to learn and I graduated from a shipbuilding institute in 1967. I accepted a position as master of one of the primary shops at Novo-Admiralteyskiy Plant in Leningrad. They built submarines of a different class and mission. I was involved in that for nearly 20 years. In 1983, I became a State Prize laureate for work in the sphere of maritime equipment and I hold nearly three dozen patents on inventions. I build small submarines and hovercraft with pleasure. And I dream of cooperation with "Agat" MGP [not found], "Sudostroyeniye" NPO, and "Almaz" TsMKB [Central Maritime Design Bureau] Chief Designers S. Porodnikov, Yu. Gorbachev, and A. Shlyakhtenko, and of those times when we will be praised not only for military ships but also about the time when the world will speak with respect about the Russian civilian ships built by the firm.

Tula Advertisement: 30-mm 2A38M Twin Antiaircraft Gun

93UM0053A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in English
15 Oct 92 p 4

[Text] 30-mm twin-barrel antiaircraft automatik gun is mounted on the antiaircraft self-propelled mount. It is intended to destroy air targets at the low altitudes (from 200 to 2000 m) and on a slant range of up to 4000 m during antiaircraft defense, as well as to destroy ground targets.

The automatik gun operates reliably under different operating conditions: at the temperature range of +/- 50°C under rain, dust and icing conditions.

Basic Data

Calibre	30 mm
Number of rifling grooves	16
Rate of fire	1950 to 2500 shots per minute
Muzzle velocity of projectile	960 m/sec
Mass of automatik gun (less water)	not over 195 kg
Cooling system	evaporative
Cooling fluid	drinking water
Mass of water	not over 28 kg
Recoil force	62 kN
Charging	pyrotechnic and manual
Number of squads	3
Fire control	remote
Length of recoil	not over 22 mm
Length of rolling-out	not over 15 mm
Length of automatik gun	3478 mm
DS power supply voltage of electric trigger and contactor	24 ⁺⁵ ₋₂ V

Baberdin: Need for Rational Approach to Conversion*93UM0049A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Oct 92 p 1*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Valeriy Baberdin: "The Military-Industrial Complex: Today Russia's Fate Largely Depends on the Fate of Conversion"]

[Text] Remember that remote, now already illusory time, when Urals Machinebuilding Plant vacuum cleaners, hunting rifles and fishing tackle from Tula, electronic appliances from Voronezh, and Ukraine and Volga aircraft plants' thermoses and washing machines freely lay and stood on the shelves of stores... The defense industry produced them at its own initiative and that was not called any sort of "conversion" whatsoever.

The term appeared and was reinforced in passing later. When everything had suddenly disappeared in the stores and we discovered how hopelessly we lagged behind the West in the production of so-called "consumer goods". We understood that the defense industry was educating more or less competent engineers, designers, and technologists in our country and that only there did the conditions exist for the production of goods based on super modern technologies. And it began... The untwisted mechanism of terminating state orders, terminating production, and the disruption of ties has brought us to where we are today—to wholesale conversion.

We have certainly wasted too much on the militarization of the country. We manufactured a huge quantity of tanks, missiles, cannons, and small arms. But let's remember something else. At the same, we developed both lasers, nuclear reactors, space vehicles, and unique cryogenic equipment in our defense industry. All of the very, very best. Our military-industrial complex managed to achieve parity with the West and that is already saying something.

Why have we become so feeble right now? Why are we making the emphasis on "abroad"? Will we really always count so much on "humanitarian aid"? Well no, the Russian land has not been depleted by golden minds and hands. We just need to preserve that wealth and use it rationally. We need to sort out our chaos—economic and industrial.

All of that has been the topic at international conferences that have been conducted in Moscow under the general perspective of "conversion and cooperation". One of them was devoted to aerospace technologies and was organized under the aegis of the UN and UNESCO and another, which was more general in nature, was conducted at the initiative of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security Issues.

"In the current year, 1992, the condition of the military-industrial complex and its work has drastically deteriorated which threatens the entire economy with destruction," stressed Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Issues Committee Chairman S. Stepashin in his report. "The abrupt deterioration of the economic state of defense enterprises has resulted in the reduction of their profitability, price increases for civilian products produced, and the reduction of their production volumes. We expect to

release over one million workers which is four times more than the corresponding indicator in the United States."

We have already cut quite a bit of deadwood. Today we have more than 20 defense industry enterprises that have totally ceased operating, nearly 130 enterprises are on the verge of a stoppage, and approximately 400 have 3-4 day work weeks. But we have these regions where the entire city economy was supported by defense enterprises. Both schools, kindergartens, and hospitals are on enterprise balance sheets. How many restricted cities were born for the sake of solving specific defense technical tasks. Now what, aren't they needed?

Defense NII's [scientific research institutes] and KB's [design bureaus] are in an even worse financial situation and this sector's cadre disintegration has accelerated. You can understand scientists and designers—today their average salary is just a little over 1,000 rubles.

What is the solution? Of course, financing conversion will be the most urgent problem in the next 2-3 years, said Russian Federation Deputy Government Chairman G. Khizha. This year alone, R77 billion has been allocated to enterprises under specific programs for a shift from military to civilian production and credit support totaled R46 billion. Of course this is little and, meanwhile, it's too bad that the difference between what is on hand and what is needed is being paid off at the expense of the very workers in the defense industry.

We need perspective. Enterprises must know what they have to make on the primary types of products in the coming years. Certainly, the fact that the order for the purchases of weapons and military equipment has already been issued will impart stability. It will be maintained at the level that was set in 1992 right up to 1995.

We also should not disregard arms sales as a source of income. It provides us real income for industry—approximately \$5 billion this year. Of course, this is a forced measure and it is being used in the strictest regime of compliance with international agreements. But then again, we also should not particularly count on the international arms market. And here competition has noticeably increased.

That is how strange things are turning out. It would seem that everyone has found a panacea from all misfortunes. There will be conversion—there will not be a problem with consumer goods. However, right now in our country conversion has reached a depth that is unprecedented in the world and there still aren't any consumer goods. NPO's [scientific production associations] offer unique super-promising technologies but they turn out to be not needed by anyone because they are extremely complicated and require high skills and the output from them will not be rapid. Now everything depends on the consumer—we need to look for him, we need to educate him, and this takes time and more time.

We want to obtain everything immediately. But that doesn't happen. We are paying a high price to gain experience. And not only in our country. Even world famous military firms there, across the ocean, that have become involved in

conversion, are also experiencing failures at times. Say, Boeing's affiliate enterprise, which previously specialized in military helicopters, decided to master the production of street cars, subway cars, and trolley buses. And it experienced failure. Soon the programs were terminated. Judicial investigations, fines, they simply tormented the production organizers. And there is a simple secret—here the very philosophy of the approach had not been converted, just like in our country, military-industrial complex's methods were applied to civilian production.

Yes, we need to be prepared for the long and tortuous path that is called conversion. We are only at the beginning of this path. According to expert assessments, 7-8 years and the sum of approximately \$150 billion are required in order to complete the process that has begun in our defense industry.

The world has certainly changed and today the disarmament process is an objective reality. But this same objective reality is the need to preserve the country's defense capability and its security. We must be capable of not only producing what we have learned to produce but also improve weapons and military equipment and create new models. Because once we have stopped, we will be inevitably thrown back—that is an axiom.

Izhevsk Director Chuguyevskiy Interviewed

93UM0112A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Oct 92 p 4

[Interview with Vasily Sergeevich Chuguyevskiy, general director of the Izhevsk Machine Plant, by Nikolay Belan; place and date not given: "Arrow on the Shield"]

[Text] Our readers are already familiar with the Izhevsk Machine Plant—we published a story about it and also an advertisement for several types of products in the first half of September. Today, we have another meeting with the Izhevsk Machine Plant again, which we begin with an interview with the general director of the enterprise, Vasily Sergeevich Chuguyevskiy.

[Belan] The September articles about your plant evoked an unexpected response. The fact that both Russian and foreign business circles responded immediately is quite understandable. But the digs of certain journalists over the advertisement of military products followed, and at the same time aimed at the entire defense complex.

[Chuguyevskiy] It was nothing surprising. During the years of Gorbachev's perestroika, some of your colleagues and politicians, and other sections of society developed, to put it mildly, a less than objective picture of the defense complex enterprises. Why and how this happened is another matter; however, attacks on defense workers have not become a tradition. Recently one of our large entrepreneurs, a political figure, stated that he learned with great satisfaction that people have left the defense enterprises. I will not understand his feelings of delight. You see, they have left not only the defense enterprises; the motor vehicle, engine building, and other "civilian" production facilities are also cutting back and sometimes shutting down.

I will use the Izhevsk Machine Plant as an example, to which I have given 30 years: defense workers have never had an easy life, as they claim, or the notorious stagnation. Our

successes and achievements cost an enormous strain of efforts of the entire collective.

I have been the head of the Izhevsk Machine Plant for 12 years and before that was its chief engineer for seven years, and during all this time I know the only privilege of defense workers: great exactingness on the quality of their products and responsibility for producing them.

Today we have to literally fight for survival together with all industry of Russia and other states of the former Union. Many troubles have befallen us: a decline in production volumes; a decrease in the population's effective demand; high interest rates for credit; indebtedness of subcontractor enterprises and trade partners; breaking of economic ties. All this has put us in very difficult conditions. But we will withstand them; we have the strengths and capabilities for this.

[Belan] Are you primarily relying on yourselves?

[Chuguyevskiy] Certainly. You see, in essence, the Izhevsk Machine Plant is several plants within a plant. It has 10 basic production facilities, the scale of which can be compared to foundry that supplies not only its own enterprise but also delivers products to 20 other plants. Our investment casting is the most powerful production facility in the country. Its annual volume, with a very small weight of the parts being cast (120 grams each on average), is 7,000 tonnes.

We also have a production facility that makes high-precision products—gyroscopes. This, so to speak, is another characteristic of our enterprise's capabilities. A third characteristic is the highest reliability and quality. In the assessment of American experts, our weapons are the best among middle-grade hunting rifles. Combat and sporting rifles also meet world standards. Here is another example. We have started to produce a powerful industrial laser—the best in the country, in the opinion of the state commission that certified it. Our machine tool for bulky electrochemical engraving satisfies international parameters, as do other types of products.

So, those who maintain that the defense industry is holding on only through military production facilities are cunning. We are able to make, and quite well, civilian products and constantly produce them. It is another matter when our scientific and technical and production potential begins to be squandered ineptly as a result of hasty, collapsed conversion.

[Belan] How has conversion affected your plant?

[Chuguyevskiy] The problems of the defense complex are common... It is a pity that we are losing top-notch specialists and masters with "golden hands." Not seeing an application for their knowledge and experience, they are leaving for cooperatives and private enterprises. True, our workers and engineers have not yet left in large numbers. We are trying to preserve capacities and change their specialization, using them in the same direction in which they worked before. For example, when the question came up about decreasing the output of electronic instruments, we switched this production facility not to making saucepans and frying pans, but to home computers, laser video players, children's electronic games, pacemakers, and so forth.

Our engineer and designer search continues today. For example, we are studying means of protecting people and property. We are creating the Peleng system, the idea of which is to place a sensor in every motor vehicle that reacts to attempts by thieves to open, steal, or rob a vehicle: signals are fed from the sensor to a receiver which the vehicle's owner has and also to a duty officer console at the police. Even if the car is stolen, the sensor continuously reports where it is located.

We are working on security systems for apartments, garages, and so forth. Our idea is this: have sensors similar to those discussed above. If there is an attempted theft, a signal is fed to the duty officer console. But let us assume burglar breaks down a door, a portion of gas is "fired" at him, the same gas with which gas cylinders are filled. If the burglars still get into the apartment or garage, more "surprises" await them. Such a security system is effective in and of itself. But the very fact of its existence stops many thieves.

We are also ready to produce gas pistols, both for workers of law enforcement agencies and for private individuals. It is a matter of getting the legislators' permission.

[Belan] It is not hard to foresee that you will have many orders. But there will also be a counteraction: they say we are arming society.

[Chuguyevskiy] Today the burglar or bandit is in a more favorable position than the honest common citizen. Doesn't he have the right to self-defense and protection? Let us proceed on the fact that the production of protective devices is, unfortunately, a forced measure.

But these devices are merely a small part of what we have begun or are planning to manufacture. We are thinking about making a water-cooled engine, have big plans jointly with VAZ for an ecologically clean motor vehicle, and are improving other production facilities. Now, when economic and partnership ties with many of our suppliers have been disrupted, we are increasingly trying to "swim on our own" and manufacture ourselves all the assemblies and parts for the products we produce, especially since we have the capabilities to do this. For example, we have created our own semiconductor technology for microassemblies.

There is another reason for this "self-sufficiency." Today we can increase the output of sporting and hunting rifles, but for this we need forging machines to make the barrels. We ordered them from a neighboring plant, but their prices are exorbitant...

Among other problems of the defense complex, there is another: our internal dissociation. But I think all these problems can be overcome if a state approach and our economic and defense interests prevail in conversion.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Problems in Debate on Future of European Security

93UM0033A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Manki Ponomarev: "Western European Defense at the Crossroads. The Politicians and Generals Are Deciding—Where To Go"]

[Text] Still yesterday everything was clear—who was a mortal enemy and who was a friend and ally. Against whom to prepare for fierce combat and on whose reliable shoulder one could always lean. But today everything has become confused in the Atlantic family. The enemy has disappeared and the enormous military might that was accumulated over the decades has turned out to be consigned to oblivion. New threats have gradually begun to emerge there where they were previously not at all anticipated.

NATO headquarters was the first to become alarmed. There they urgently began patching the old and then developing a new strategy. They began to shift the emphasis in the bloc's military policy from armed confrontation with the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies, mostly similar to a balance on the verge of war and yet what kind of war—missile, nuclear, global—to opposing risks that are emerging in many directions and with not only military resources but also with political, economic, and other resources.

Structural perestroika was begun in parallel. It has affected both the command and control system and the alliance's armed forces themselves in order to make them more flexible and mobile. A ceremony has already taken place that was dedicated to the creation of NATO's "rapid reaction force" in which Secretary General M. Werner and Allied Armed Forces in Europe Supreme Commander J. Shalikashvili participated. Its formation must be completed by 1995. According to plans, the rapid reaction force's total strength will be approximately 100,000 servicemen from 12 countries.

One more step remained from these measures to a deviation from the North Atlantic Alliance's fundamental strategic principle—defense of just the territory of its participants. And this step has been made. A decision was made at the NATO Council session in Oslo in July 1992 that permits the transfer of the bloc's military resources to the jurisdiction of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] to conduct peacekeeping operations, including in those regions that are located outside the alliance's sphere of responsibility. That decision is unprecedented in the history of the Atlantic Community.

That decision was prompted by the events that are occurring in Yugoslavia. And it wasn't difficult to sense the fears that have been caused by the instability and armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR as the underlying theme. But it was assessed that way not only in Western Europe. There they perceived it as a fundamental change of the North Atlantic Alliance's entire system of approach to international conflicts.

The reaction of the West Europeans was varied. For example, France has considered it necessary to more actively participate in the development of the bloc's political decisions and in general to play a much greater role in it than during the entire last quarter of a century. In Paris, yes, and in some other European capitals, they are already not hiding the yearning to put an end to the United States' dominating position in NATO. U.S. interests cannot coincide with the interests of the European Community which, even with difficulties and with temporary recoils, is moving along the path of greater integration and a transformation into a European Union—a powerful political and economic force.

But this alliance still needs its own, and not an Atlantic or all the more so an American policy, including in the sphere of defense. It needs its own "armed hand". The Western European Union—WEU—could of course become that hand. It has already existed for many years but has never played an especially active role, while remaining in NATO's shadow, although it has also at times been recognized as its "European support".

Right now WEU's position has changed substantially. The formation of an operational organ that has received the modest designation of "planning cell" has already begun. And essentially this is a sort of multinational headquarters that is tasked with being involved with inventorying those forces which the participating countries allocate to the alliance's control and planning operations with their participation.

Appeals to create a "European deterrent force" through the unification of the nuclear weapons of France and Great Britain are being listened to more seriously. Already at the beginning of the year, President F. Mitterrand essentially rejected the principle of autonomy for France's nuclear forces, having stated that nuclear forces are one of the primary issues for building European defense. And now British Defense Minister M. Rifkind admits that "common sense and history dictate the need for cooperation and consolidation between the two Western European nuclear forces."

But we know very well that serious differences exist in this sphere between the two countries. Until now the French doctrine proceeded from the principle of independence from U.S. nuclear forces and France develops its own nuclear weapons. England, stresses the newspaper *LIBERATION*, on the contrary, "completely includes its nuclear forces in the Atlantic context," and its nuclear weapons—are entirely of American manufacture.

But then again, the Anglo-French cooperation in the nuclear sphere that has emerged could take various forms. For example, they are talking about plans for coordinated nuclear submarine patrols or the creation of "air-to-surface" nuclear missiles for both countries' air forces. Diverse variations are being described. But nevertheless, writes Paris' *LE MONDE*, this cooperation still must be coordinated with the treaties previously signed with the United States. In this case, the French will have to take another step forward—join the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. This could signify, *LE MONDE* states, that France is breaking with the dogma of General de Gaulle, under whom it had left the North Atlantic bloc's military organization already in 1966.

So, what is the result? What path are the European politicians and strategists selecting in the sphere of defense—reliance on their own forces or modernization of NATO? There is no final answer. On the one hand, nine Western European Union member-states had already officially announced their intention to transform that organization into "the military component of the European Union" in December 1991 at Maastricht. But, on the other hand, in that same Maastricht document they wrote that WEU is a "tool for strengthening European support of the Atlantic Alliance".

Well, look into this here. It is no coincidence that the respectable English *FINANCIAL TIMES* has written that "there is still a long way to go until a satisfactory definition of the relations between WEU and NATO. These two organizations are obviously competing with each other." At an international colloquium on the issues of defense that recently occurred in Paris, as a result of a prolonged discussion, the majority of its participants arrived at the opinion that first the EC member-states must create political structures in accordance with the Maastricht agreements and then select a single strategic approach to defense and already only later—talk about "European nuclear deterrence".

Well, what about the Americans? They have their own, no matter how you assess it, consistent policy. Although Washington currently asserts that the United States no longer intends to play the role of "World Policeman", they still do not intend to reject either the leading role in the world in general or leadership of the NATO bloc in particular. Despite the fact that their military presence in Europe is steadily decreasing (the American Congress just resolved that it must be restricted to 100,000 servicemen by 1996), Washington does not want the North Atlantic Alliance, which is its instrument of influence on the Europeans, to slip away from under its tutelage. In this, the United States to a certain degree enjoys support from Germany. But the latter also would not be averse to gaining more room for maneuver in the military sphere and, because of that, it is rushing to create a 35,000 man "Eurocorps" jointly with France that is autonomous from NATO's military leadership.

And there is yet another path which the Western European capitals often forget about for some reason. This is the path of creating a reliable system of defense within the framework of the common European process that is directed at the reduction of the possibility of the emergence of military conflicts in the entire space from the Atlantic to the Urals and the improvement of the mechanisms for their prevention and resolution. This is obviously the most rational path.

Comment on Walesa Proposal of 'NATO-bis' Alliance

93UM0092A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Manki Ponomarev: "A NATO Double in Eastern Europe. Illusion or Reality?: Notes of a Military Reviewer"]

[Text] An unusual abbreviation can be encountered with increasing frequency on the pages of the foreign press: "NATO-bis." What NATO means, everyone knows. It's the abbreviation for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The organization is rather well known. But what is this "bis" business? Is there some second NATO that is supplementing and duplicating the first, which was established over four decades ago at the peak of the cold war and which has existed to this day?

No, another organization (or alliance, because NATO is a military-political alliance, a bloc of 14 Western European states, the USA and Canada) with the same name hasn't appeared. This is a figurative expression, and it is willingly used by publicists and political scientists. It refers not to an

organized military alliance of some group of countries that actually exists, but to a hypothetical, proposed alliance.

The term "NATO-bis" was placed into circulation by Poland's President Lech Walesa. It was he who, during a visit to Germany in the spring of this year, advanced the conception of establishing a kind of transitional association of Eastern and Central European countries as a stepping stone into NATO.

Finding themselves out of the cage, so to speak, following disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, these countries felt extremely uncomfortable on their own. Almost immediately, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and then the Baltic countries—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—expressed a desire to become members of NATO.

Their intention to join the North Atlantic alliance was associated with a number of factors. First there was the desire to secure themselves against the real or imaginary "imperial ambitions" of the former USSR. Second, they wanted to come under the protection of the strong partners brought together under NATO. Third, they wished to acquire the right to vote on decisions concerning major political and military problems of Western Europe. Fourth, they wanted to gain access to high-tech Western armaments. This became urgent to them given the rapid aging of their own military equipment and weapons, which were principally of Soviet manufacture or were made on the basis of Soviet plans and licenses. Fifth, they wanted to ensure the fastest possible withdrawal of former Soviet—and now Russian—forces, which is especially true of the Baltic countries. Sixth....

Oh well, this is probably enough to explain the desire of countries of Eastern and Central Europe to become members of NATO. However, contrary to the expectations of some politicians, the NATO countries did not display any special desire to accept new members into their ranks. This isn't that hard to explain either. The leaders of the bloc could not but be apprehensive of the way Russia and other CIS countries would perceive NATO's inordinate enlargement: Would this not revive its image as an enemy? Nor were all ready to agree to further expansion of the bloc's sphere of responsibility. Difficulties would doubtlessly arise in attempts to integrate the military structures of Eastern European countries, created in one way or another under the auspices of the former USSR, into the Atlantic Military Organization. And this is not to mention the economic problems. The experience of unifying Germany and merging the Bundeswehr with the GDR National People's Army revealed the great scale and complexity of these problems within the framework of even a single state.

Nonetheless, the idea of having a number of former Warsaw Pact allies join the North Atlantic alliance is circulating in the air. In the words of Yezha Milevskiy [transliteration], chief of the National Security Bureau in the administration of the Polish president, Walesa's conception of a kind of transitional association of Eastern and Central European countries—a so-called "NATO-bis"—continues to remain viable, since "the demand for such a system has not diminished."

And so, "NATO-bis" is a stage along the road to the original NATO. The initiators of this idea feel that future members of the double of the North Atlantic alliance in the east and

center of Europe could conclude the appropriate agreement and assume specific military and political responsibilities. In this case they would operate under the protection of the bloc's headquarters in Brussels, and they would agree to relinquish territorial claims and the threat to use force in bilateral relations, to transfer their entire arsenal of mass destruction weapons to NATO's control, and mandatorily take joint repressive action against states that violate this agreement. This would bring the moment of official entry into NATO that the Eastern European countries desire that much closer.

For the time being, these are only proposals and plans. In the military area, most "applicants" to the North Atlantic alliance are experiencing a period of either establishment of their own armed forces (the Baltics) or their deep reorganization. For example while the Polish armed forces recently contained 410,000 servicemen, in the new organization their number should decrease to 180,000. In place of three military districts, four are being established, and in place of 12 divisions, there will be seven corps, each of which will consist of four brigades. Up to 70 percent of the weapons and combat equipment, all of which is falling ever farther behind the standards of other European armies, are to be replaced.

Similar problems also have to be solved in Hungary. As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, its Ministry of Defense and General Staff are working hard on a project to divide the armed forces into two national armies—Czech and Slovak.

As far as concerns Romania and Bulgaria, which had also been members of the Warsaw Pact, they are also pursuing a line of coming closer to NATO. Bulgaria has moved especially far forward on this path. In the words of Lieutenant General Stoyan Topalov, chief of General Staff of the Bulgarian army, it "has significantly overtaken other countries of Central and Eastern Europe" in practical cooperation and partnership with the military organization of the North Atlantic alliance. But neither Bulgaria nor Romania is presently discussing entry into the alliance.

Does this mean, then, that all of this talk about an "Eastern European NATO" is still just talk, and nothing more? Well, yes and no. Its core has already begun to form, though primarily just in the political area. There is discussion of a so-called "Visegrad Troyka"—an agreement for close cooperation between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, reached at a conference of the leaders of these states in the Hungarian city of Visegrad.

In the opinion of the Polish government the "Visegrad Troyka" (it will obviously transform into a "Tetrad" with the division of Czechoslovakia) should operate on the Benelux model. And everyone knows what sort of model this is. In the 1940s the association consisting of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg became the seed about which both the Western (subsequently the Western European) Alliance and NATO crystallized. It is no accident that 57 percent of the respondents to a survey conducted by the Polish Public Opinion Research Center felt that a defensive alliance and military cooperation within the framework of the "Troyka" would be extremely advantageous to Poland's interests. By the way, 35 percent of the respondents favored cooperation with NATO.

All of this is receiving a positive response from NATO. Thus, General Dieter Krauss, deputy commander-in-chief of the bloc's Joint Armed Forces in Europe, emphasized during a visit to Prague that the alliance will develop contacts both with Czechia and Slovakia. And General Vigleyk Eyde [transliteration], chairman of the NATO Military Committee, expressed the bloc's readiness to consult on establishment of the armed forces of the three Baltic states, to supply relatively inexpensive equipment and gear to them, and help them train military personnel.

And so, military cooperation between NATO and the states of Central and Eastern Europe is acquiring increasingly greater scope. Here is the opinion of General Dzhon Shalikashvili, the supreme commander-in-chief of the alliance's Joint Armed Forces in Europe, in this regard. He believes that problems of nuclear security and joint training of military contingents in international forces for peace-keeping purposes are the most important areas of such cooperation. And discussing the possible acceptance of countries of this region into NATO, Shalikashvili tactfully noted that "this issue remains open."

How do we evaluate the "NATO-bis" undertaking? Whether to establish it or not is not the concern of only the countries that brought this idea into being. It affects all of Europe, and primarily questions of its security. Anyway, there already is an institution that can solve such problems—the SBSYe [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. It is not yet sufficiently developed, it does not possess the necessary means of implementing its policy, and it has not become a regional organ of the United Nations. But all of this will transpire in the future. The efforts of all Europeans should be directed not at establishing new blocs or duplicating old ones, but rather at raising the effectiveness of the SBSYe and developing its structure, so that it could in fact ensure real security for all of its members.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION. The problems of Albania's political, military and economic cooperation with NATO were discussed during talks between NATO Assistant Secretary General John Krindler and Albanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Arian Starovy [transliteration]. This was reported by the ATA [not further identified] press agency. It cited A. Starovy's statement: "We are interested in developing relations with NATO and in ensuring collective security in Europe." In his words, Albania is striving to establish a modern army and security service utilizing the practical experience of the member nations of this organization.

Krindler noted that the NATO leadership was prepared to organize regular consultations with the Albanian side on political and military aspects.

SECURITY SERVICES

Khasbulatov Meets with Personnel from NW Border Troops District

93UM0139A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Nov 92 pp 1-2

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Aleksandr Pelts: "Ruslan Khasbulatov Visits Russo-Estonian Border"]

[Text] Ruslan Khasbulatov, Supreme Soviet chairman, visited a customs station on the Russo-Estonian border in the Ivangorod area on his trip to St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast.

The parliament's speaker and official persons of the St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast administrations accompanying him held a discussion with Major General Vladimir Vyukov, commander of the Northwestern Border District. The discussion dealt with acute problems troubling the Border Troops, largely involving increasing incidence of open smuggling of industrial raw materials, especially non-ferrous metals, across the Estonian administrative border.

The RIA [Russian Information Agency] correspondent provided information on the latest incident of this kind. Unknown persons damaged the local electric power station in the neighborhood of the settlement of Kuuresvare. A Border Troop security detail responding to a signal was fired upon from hunting weapons. The attackers surrendered after the Border Troops fired warning shots. It was determined that two of the detainees were residents of Narva; one, of Ivangorod. They made no secret of the fact that they were attempting to "obtain" nonferrous metal at the power station.

The need for effecting a rapid change in the border from the present administrative status to one of a state border is also attested to by other occurrences. Thus, racketeers wearing the uniform of Border Troops appear in the area of border posts to do as they wish. Also creating considerable difficulties is the confusion surrounding the present system of issuing licenses for exporting industrial raw materials from Russia. Many unresolved problems remain in the area of export arrangements applicable to citizens passing through customs stations.

The speaker of the Russian parliament exhibited deep concern over problems of social protection for Border Troops and the inadequate state of technical security for customs stations. The redefining of the border from administrative to state status will tend to alleviate many problems. This was specifically addressed in a conference protocol that was signed, with definite measures outlined with the intent of assuring more effective work on the part of the Border Troops.

'Transparent' Borders, Smuggling Necessitate a 'Law on Borders'

93UM0085A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Anatoliy Stasovskiy: "'Transparent' Borders Will Not Stop Smuggling. A Law on Borders Is Needed"]

[Text] Smuggling is one of the most acute problems for the Russian Federation today. Various kinds of timeservers and so-called businessmen or, simply put, criminals have become addicted to embezzling and pilfering in knocking together millions in a feverish haste.

Associates of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, the Russian MVD, and customs stand in the path of the contraband flow, but the professionals' efforts often are reduced to naught.

This is occurring largely because of the absence of a Law on the State Border, a customs code, when it is possible to hold

"businessmen" and "merchants" criminally liable, i.e., an illegal transaction or illegal export of raw materials from the Russian Federation can be qualified as smuggling. It is very difficult to draw the line where a criminal case must be initiated and when only an administrative investigation must be started.

Necessary documents already have been developed or are in the development stage and are awaiting adoption in the Russian Supreme Soviet.

Our correspondent was told in particular how things stand with adoption of one of the main ones, the Russian Federation Law of the State Border, by Igor Nikulin, chairman of the Border and Customs Subcommittee of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security. He emphasized that the first version of the law was examined in the Committee back at the end of May but was rejected due to substantial omissions. The apparatus of the commanding general of Russian Border Guard Troops prepared a new draft. In Nikulin's words, now it has to be considered at a Committee session and sent to ministries and departments that are interested, so to speak, changes have to be made, and only then can it be submitted for Supreme Soviet consideration. Ideally, said the deputy, this can occur only in December.

The subcommittee chairman agreed that although it is obvious time has been lost, nevertheless it is also impossible to hurry. The law must be studied carefully and comprehensively. Nikulin also noted that recently the Supreme Soviet suggested that the Russian Federation president submit what has been worked out on security of the Russian state border for Parliament's consideration. The Russian Federation Committee on Defense and Security for its part has proposals on giving the administrative borders with Baltic and Transcaucasus states the status of state border (until the signing of bilateral agreements).

Meanwhile that which was considered the state's property and wealth since time immemorial goes abroad from Russia each day. According to Russian Federation Ministry of Security data, in just two months of this year (from 25 July through 25 September) during Operation "Trawl" security associates together with MVD entities and customs officials averted the export from Russia of 665,000 tonnes of oil and oil products, 17,000 tonnes of rare-earth metals, 50,000 m³ of timber and lumber, and a large quantity of weapons and ammunition, particularly an Mi-8 helicopter, one APC, 2,000 tonnes of powder, 5,000 shells, and 10 million cartridges. The raw materials, basic supplies and commodities totalled R6.6 billion!

Baltic and Transcaucasus countries are the main direction for illegal export of raw materials and commodities. Oil, metal and timber are dispatched to the Baltic and gasoline, fuel oil, weapons, ammunition and medicines to the Transcaucasus. As soon as associates of the Russian special services close highways, contraband immediately follows country roads, and when they shift to country roads, the "goods" depart by water or air. Neither the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, nor the Russian MVD, nor customs officials have the personnel and equipment to place posts everywhere.

And in addition to exporting everything without exception, at this time there also is a massive import of money into Russia. It is not enough that it is being used to buy up everything the smugglers have not managed to export; this currency expansion also is raising prices in our market by many times.

Here are just a few facts. R637 million were found on one passenger on the Riga-Moscow train. One hundred million arrived by An-26 aircraft from Vilnius to Syktyvkar. And an unusual incident occurred on 11 October. Over R50 million was discovered in an An-26 which flew to Moscow from Riga. While its ownership was being clarified, the "stern lads" accompanying the money pulled out weapons and decisively declared that it was the territory of a sovereign state aboard the aircraft, so they were sent back to Riga with the money. And right away an An-24 with nine packages of money arrived again from the Baltic, this time in Groznyy. According to the most modest calculations, this was even more than R300 million...

But from where is the leak of strategic raw materials and scarce supplies occurring above all? KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was given the following data in the Russian Federation Ministry of Security: there was an attempt to export 293,000 tonnes of fuel oil from Volgograd (joint venture) and 600 tonnes of copper from Vladimir to Germany basically on false documents, the filling out of which as a rule is called an unfortunate mistake by the transgressors.

Seeing the impunity for such serious violations, there are more and more who wish to enrich themselves at state expense, but it is time to put an end to the boundless plundering of Russia. We cannot wait for the appropriate departments in those same Baltic states, for example, to undertake to sign the agreement on the border. They understand their own advantage there and do not plan to let it slip. That is why Russians so need their own laws. "Transparent" borders will not stop smuggling.

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